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ABSTRACT
CANADIAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE
PROCESS OF POLICY-MAKING FOR IRAQI REFUGEES
by
Mia Gauthier
The American University in Cairo
The purpose of this research is to understand how the Canadian government came to
decide when was the opportune time to begin the resettlement of Iraqis, what
magnitude these resettlement operations would take, and whom, amongst the millions
of Iraqis displaced by the war following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, would be selected
for resettlement to Canada. The research identifies different sets of influences on the
policy-making process related to the resettlement of Iraqi refugees to Canada, and
explores how these resettlement policies were initiated, developed, implemented, and
shaped over time. A literature review is undertaken on the history of the rationale
supporting the use of resettlement as a possible durable solution to refugee crises.
Expert interviews were conducted with representatives of the Government of Canada,
UNHCR Ottawa, Amnesty International Canada, the Canadian Council for Refugees,
Iraqi community organizations in Canada, and other experts in the field, in order to
collect factual accounts, as well as personal and institutional perspectives on the topic.
It was found that the most delimiting factor was the budget allocated to the
resettlement program, determined by the Canadian Parliament. In turn, the Parliament
was said to be most influenced, on the one hand, by the insistently expressed opinions
of Canadian voters, and, on the other, by the necessity to retain Canada’s
humanitarian image. Where and how the budget is spent is highly dependent upon the
directives of UNHCR. The budget is also allocated strategically in order to maximize
the leverage of resettlement operations for all those affected – refugee populations and
asylum countries alike.
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INTRODUCTION
A number of authors have looked at how refugee resettlement policies of a given
country are formed and how they evolve. Refugee resettlement was a preferred
durable solution to refugee crises, and the subject of many studies from the late
seventies to the early nineties, after which it became less frequently applied by the
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
main resettlement countries of the time. In the late eighties and nineties, two other
possible durable solutions to refugee crises took precedence: local integration in the
country of first asylum, and voluntary repatriation to the country of origin. In the
context of the resettlement operations that took place following the Second World
War, and until the end of the large-scale resettlement of the Vietnamese boat people in
the 1980s and early 90s, resettlement countries tended to accept large numbers of
individuals under their refugee resettlement programs according to the populations’
need for resettlement as determined by UNHCR. Lippert and others1 outlined some of
the reasons for a change in the trend of mass refugee resettlement operations, such as
the weakening of the economies of the potential resettlement states, and the ensuing
difficulties for these states to justify to their citizens the intake and financial and social
support of these vulnerable populations. Such factors, among others, have since
brought these states and UNHCR to prioritize the implementation of other durable
solutions to refugee crises over resettlement.

However, resettlement operations worldwide have far from ceased since this period,
despite the fact that resettlement is found to be the most expensive durable solution
for governments and UNHCR to implement. This is mostly due to the high overseas
1

Lippert, R. (1998). Rationalities and refugee resettlement, Economy and Society, vol 27, no 4, pp
380-406.
1

resettlement processing costs, and to the considerable costs of the integration services
and financial assistance offered to refugees upon their arrival to the country of
resettlement. Despite these costs, however, the original aim of resettlement according
to UNHCR and to the major receiving countries was for resettlement to be made an
option for a) the most vulnerable members of a concerned refugee population, and b)
individuals or groups for whom both local repatriation and voluntary repatriation are
not feasible, or not expected to be feasible within a reasonable period of time. Over
time, resettlement has been used more sparingly. However, as discovered over the
course of this research, it has been used more strategically, with the aim of alleviating
a number of the consequences of mass refugee flows, all whilst resettling only a select
few.2,3

Context of the post-2003 Iraqi refugee movement
Iraqi refugee flows have been ongoing since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
According to many Iraqis, international workers in Iraq, and even UNHCR, this
situation of mass exodus was not expected to dissipate for some time to come.4,5,6,7
According to UNHCR’s Country Operations Profile for Iraq published in early 2010,
the overall security situation in Iraq was reported to have steadily improved, despite
the fact that violent events continued to erupt sporadically throughout the country.8
At the time of writing this research, however, violence in Iraq, especially in Baghdad
2

UNHCR. (2010a). UNHCR – Resettlement, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html
Pressé, D. (2009). Interview with the author on 15 July 2009. Ottawa. [Digital recording in
possession of the author, Recorded into two parts, A and B]
4
Reichmann, D. (2009). Cheney: CIA Did Nothing Illegal in Interrogations, January 2009,
http://i.abcnews.com/Politics/WireStory?id=6606473&page=2
5
Lubold, G. (2009). Could Iraq violence affect US withdrawal plan?, April 2009,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0424/p02s09-usfp.html
6
Institute for War and Peace Reporting. (2009). Baghdadis Resigned to Sporadic Violence, 29 May
2009, ICR No. 291, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a28c218c.html
7
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2009). Iraqi civilian death toll lowest since 2003, June 2009,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a293d81c.html
8
UNHCR. (2010b). UNHCR – Iraq, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486426
3

2

and its surrounding region, seemed to be steadily increasing:
October 2009

155 are killed in a twin truck bomb attack in Baghdad.9

December 2009

More than 127 are killed in a series of car bombs in Baghdad.10

7 January 2010

Eight are killed in a series of bomb attacks on police in Hit, West of
Baghdad.11

25 January 2010

More than 36 dead after three large explosions targeting Baghdad
hotels housing Western businessmen and media.12

1 February 2010

More than 41 killed and 106 injured by a female suicide-bomber in
Baghdad.13

5 February 2010

Two suicide bombers kill more than 40 and injure more than 140 in
Karbala.14

22 February 2010 Bombings, beheadings and shootings leave 23 dead, including 9
children.15

In March 2009, UNHCR announced that 60,000 Iraqis were still in need of
resettlement. However, UNHCR also reported that tens of thousands of Iraqis
returned to Iraq in 2008 and in the first months of 2009 due to improved security
conditions in Iraq.16 Meanwhile, apart from these 60,000 identified individuals, many
others were also in great need of the support of the international community, namely,
other Iraqis perhaps outside of UNHCR’s radar, the states of asylum hosting the
majority of the Iraqi refugees, and the Iraqi government struggling with its
reconstruction operations, its returnees, and its highly unstable security situation.
Also in need of support from the international community in the rest of the world were
9

BBC News. (2009a). BBC News – Violence returns to Iraq,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8402014.stm
10
BBC News. (2009b). BBC News – Violence returns to Iraq,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8402014.stm
11
BBC News. (2010a). BBC News – Iraq bomb attack on senior police kills eight,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8444946.stm
12
BBC News. (2010b). BBC News – Iraq capital rocked by deadly triple bombing,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8478916.stm
13
BBC News. (2010c). BBC News – Female suicide bomber kills dozens in Iraq,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8490819.stm
14
BBC News. (2010d). BBC News – Bombings hit Iraq Shia pilgrims in Karbala,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8500131.stm
15
The New York Times, Spike in Iraq Violence as Vote Nears – NYTimes.com,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/world/middleeast/23iraq.html
16
UNHCR. (2009a). Iraqi refugees leave Jordan, Syria in first resettlement to Germany, March 2009,
http://www.unhcr.org/49c273aa2.html
3

the large groups of refugees and/or IDPs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Darfur, Chad,
South Sudan, and others.

What factors led to Canada’s decision, then, to start prioritizing and increasing the
resettlement of Iraqis only in 2008 rather than any time before, to reduce resource
allocations to the resettlement operations for other refugee groups in the rest of the
world who are in need, and perhaps even more in need at the time? How and why
were these priorities identified and implemented?

Recent Resettlement of Iraqis to Canada
UNHCR has been appealing to the Canadian government and other major resettlement
countries to take in Iraqis since soon after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Canada
resettled close to 100 Iraqis in 2006, and a total of 900 in 2007. In 2008, Iraqis
represented 19.8% of those resettled to Canada, while 15.4% were resettled from
Colombia, 13.1% from Afghanistan, and less than 3 % from Sudan.17 As many as
2,134 were resettled in 2008,18 representing more than double the number of Iraqis
admitted the previous year. Canada also announced in early 2009 that it planned to
double this number again in 2009, by resettling a minimum of 12,000 persons out of
Syria over the next three or four years: 2,500 would be selected every year through the
Private Sponsorship of Refugees program (PSR), and 1,400 Iraqis would be selected
by the end of 2009 through the Government-Assisted Refugee Program (GAR).

What are the reasons for these recent increases in Iraqi resettlement numbers in
17

Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR). (2009a). Email communication. Statistics prepared by CCR
for its members from data provided by CIC for CCR internal use only, 19 March 2009. This figure
includes both Government- Assisted and Privately Sponsored refugees.
18
Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR). (2009a). Email communication. Statistics prepared by CCR
for its members from data provided by CIC for CCR internal use only, 19 March 2009. This figure
includes both Government-Assisted and Privately Sponsored refugees.
4

Canada? In addition, why was Canada perceived in having a delayed reaction to the
Iraqi refugee crisis, in comparison to other resettlement countries such as the United
States, Australia, Sweden, Norway, and others? The number of Iraqis resettled by
Canada and other resettlement countries combined over the last few years represents
only a minimal percentage of the number of Iraqi individuals UNHCR identified to be
in need of resettlement. What, then, is Canada’s aim in investing considerable
amounts of resources, to resettle only a minimal proportion of those in need? Are the
few who are resettled some of the most vulnerable Iraqi refugees (what is understood
to be the original intent of resettlement according to UNHCR and the Canadian
government)? How are these policies relating to the resettlement of refugees, and
more particularly of Iraqis, drafted, implemented, and adapted to the continually
evolving Iraqi refugee situation? The author will attempt to shed light on these
questions throughout this thesis.

5

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The author has observed a widely spread misunderstanding of the purposes of the
Canadian Refugee Resettlement Program. There are some diverging perspectives on
its core objectives, and a lack of knowledge of the humanitarian, political, and
economic limitations that shape the system and simply do not allow it to spread in all
the directions wished by all sides – political leaders, government representatives,
advocates, the Canadian public, concerned international organizations (such as
UNHCR), concerned countries of asylum, and refugees themselves. This observed
misunderstanding and lack of knowledge, are understood to be the source of much
criticism and expressed disappointments about Canada’s resettlement program. Also
misunderstood are the roles of all concerned parties in the policy-making process.

Through this research, the author thus aimed to gain a better understanding of the
policy-making process in the case of the Iraqi refugee situation and resettlement to
Canada. It is thought that this knowledge will help broaden the understanding of the
author and other actors and researchers in the field of resettlement, to better
understand how decisions regarding refugee resettlement are made, and what different
levels of influences are involved. The author hopes that by obtaining a clearer and
more transparent picture of this process through this desk research and interviewing of
advocates, Canadian service provider organizations, and other partners in the refugee
resettlement program, that all may gain better understanding of the Canadian
government’s perspective of the place and functionality of resettlement in the
contemporary context.

6

SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
Resettlement, as a possible durable solution to refugee crises, was initially meant to be
applied most particularly in cases where local integration in the country of asylum and
voluntary repatriation were not possible at current times, or in the foreseeable future.
Resettlement programs dating prior to the mid-1970s were mainly ad-hoc programs
that were able to respond to such situations in a timely manner. With the further
embedding of resettlement into governmental programming structures, this option
became tied down with multiple bureaucratic cords, and a heavy financial burden,
which made this option harder and harder to justify to citizens of major resettlement
countries.

On the surface, global resettlement operations do not seem to be serving their original
purposes: to provide a swift and durable solution to refugee crises (other than for the
small portion of those resettled globally), to resettle those determined as most
vulnerable, and those not able to permanently integrate into the country of asylum or
return to their country of origin. Instead, resettlement seems to be used sparingly,
rather than according to the actual resettlement needs of refugees, as assessed by
UNHCR. What, then, is the value in using resettlement at all, for the small proportion
of the world’s refugees who will be able to benefit from it?

With regard to the resettlement of Iraqis, although the refugee crisis in and around
Iraq was ongoing from the time of the onset of the war in 2003, it was only in 20062007 that the Canadian government began considering mass resettlement operations
for the Iraqi population. This recent increase and focus on Iraqi refugees also came
during a period where other populations in the world (e.g. from Afghanistan, Pakistan,

7

Sudan, Chad, Sri Lanka and others) would arguably have greater needs for
resettlement than the Iraqi population. What factors, then, explain the timing and the
breadth of Canada’s altered position on the resettlement of Iraqis?

8

CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF RESETTLEMENT AND THE IRAQI REFUGEE
CRISIS IN RELATION TO CANADA

BACKGROUND
UNHCR and Resettlement
Resettlement is one of three main durable solutions to refugee situations established
by UNHCR, along with local integration in the refugee’s country of first asylum, and
voluntary repatriation. It was first determined by the International Refugee
Organization (IRO) to be the preferred durable solution to the plight of the estimated 1
million European refugees who fled their homes during the Second World War. The
next large-scale resettlement operations took place for the approximately 2 million
Vietnamese boat people resettled between the late seventies and eighties. However,
this refugee movement was thought to be associated to very high costs, and
particularly in terms of the costs of resettlement operations and integration programs
for this group.19 In addition, during and after these larger waves of resettlement, some
feared that such mass resettlement operations were possibly creating a ‘pull-factor’,
and somehow encouraging individuals to flee their countries of origins only in the
hope of being resettled.20 Durable solutions to refugee crises thus began to be rethought, and re-shaped by UNHCR, major receiving states, and other international
actors. In the 1990s, further emphasis was placed on voluntary repatriation, the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees, Ms. Sadako Ogota, even designating the nineties as
the decade of voluntary repatriation. Local integration was then also favored over
resettlement whenever possible.21

19

Loescher, G. (2008). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): the politics
and practice of refugee protection into the twenty-first century, Routledge, p.48.
20
Casasola, M. (2001). Current Trends and New Challenges for Canada’s Resettlement Program,
Refuge, 19 (4), p. 77.
21
Loescher, G. Ibid.
9

Canada’s history of resettlement and related legislation
One of CIC’s official missions is to work towards building a stronger Canada, by
notably maintaining Canada’s humanitarian tradition through protecting refugees and
others in refugee-like situations. It is thus CIC’s aim to have an approach to
immigration that supports global humanitarian efforts to assist those in need of
protection.22 This aim drives Canada’s refugee resettlement program and reflects the
commitment made by Canada when ratifying the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.
The Canadian government and its citizens take much pride in being considered by the
world as a leading humanitarian country. Canada is the second resettlement and
asylum country after the United States. It is considered one of the leaders in the
resettlement of both refugees and other individuals in need of protection. With its
resettlement program, Canada aims to bring the concerned individuals in the country,
inter alia, to contribute in making Canada a richer and more prosperous society.23
The latter aim is implemented through the Canadian resettlement policy related to the
refugees’ potential to successfully establish themselves in Canada, although this
resettlement criterion is applied more or less heavily, depending on the level of
protection needs of the applicant.24

Canada’s resettlement program came into existence some time after the end of World
War II. Since this period, the country has resettled over 700,000 Convention
Refugees and persons in refugee-like situations.25 In 1969, Canada ratified both the
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter
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named 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol).26 These international instruments are
today incorporated into Canadian law through section 96 of the 2002 Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA):
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason
of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return
to that country.27
The 2002 IRPA was also shaped by criticisms of Canada’s resettlement activities
received in the 1980s and 90s, concerning the slow speed and lengthiness of Canada’s
resettlement processing, and thus its inability to meet the needs of refugees with
urgent protection needs. However, in its attempt to respond to these concerns, Canada
aimed increased the settlement potential of the populations selected for resettlement.
In doing so, however, Canada also limited the access to resettlement to individuals
who would potentially present excessive demand on the Canadian public health
system, or to those who may be unable to demonstrate a potential ability to quickly
and successfully establish themselves.28

In response to these limitations and operational issues, the Refugee Resettlement
Model (RRM) was developed in 1997, and proposed the following measures:
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•

To prioritize refugees’ protection rather than their potential ability to
successfully establish themselves once in Canada

•

To prioritize family reunification

•

To ensure the immediate resettlement of urgent protection cases.29

These measures and others were incorporated into bill C-31, which was later
incorporated into the 2002 IRPA. The 2002 IRPA also notably removed the
‘excessive medical demand’ criterion for refugee applicants.30

Canadian resettlement statistical figures
Resettled refugees account for approximately 4 to 6% of all immigrants to Canada. If
added to the proportion of individuals who represent successful asylum claimants, the
total percentage of protected persons selected by Canada in proportion to all migrants
to Canada is between 10 and 13%.31 Canada, along with the United States and
Australia, oversees one of the three largest existing refugee resettlement programs.
As a point of comparison, in 2008, the United States resettled 60,108 refugees and
admitted 22,930 asylum claimants (totaling to 83,038 individuals),32 Canada admitted
a total of 21,860,33 and Australia, a total of 14,000.34 This represented a proportion of
1 for every 3,667 individuals in the United States,35 1 for every 1,539 individuals in
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Australia,36 and 1 for every 1,524 individuals in Canada.37 A total of sixteen countries
have a yearly quota of refugees they admit to their territories, while other countries
only run ad-hoc programs set up according to the needs of a given refugee population
at a given time.38

Canada’s three resettlement programs
Canada has three main resettlement programs: the Government-Assisted Refugee
(GAR) Program,39 the Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) program,40 and the
Joint Assistance Sponsorship (JAS) program.41 Those resettled under the GAR
program are referred to Canada by UNHCR, and are supported financially by the
Canadian government, and assisted by the staff of Canadian Service Provider
Organizations (SPOs). On the other hand, Canadian individuals or organizations
wishing to sponsor a refugee for resettlement to Canada must submit a PSR
application for this individual or family to CIC. Canadian visa offices can also
suggest a case to be resettled by a Private Sponsor (Visa Office Referral – VOR).42
Once the private sponsorship application is approved by CIC, or that a VOR is
matched to a Canadian sponsor, a Sponsorship Agreement is signed, and the file is
sent to the visa office abroad for adjudication. Private Sponsors are entirely
responsible for the cost of the application process, and for the financial assistance
36
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provided to the refugees for up to one year. Sponsors are also responsible for
assisting refugees in their settlement process, also for up to one year. Lastly, the Joint
Assistance Sponsorship (JAS) program represents a combination of the GAR and PSR
programs. Cases are referred or selected in the same manner as the PSR program,
although individuals will receive financial assistance from the Canadian government
for up to three years, and the sponsors will assist the refugees through their process of
resettlement during the same period.

The existence of these different protection programs thus allows for a greater number
of individuals to be resettled to Canada through different channels. Through these
programs, Canada is able to offer resettlement to the most vulnerable (through the
GAR program), to promote family or community reunification (through the PSR
program), and also to allow access to those who may have otherwise fallen under
other programs’ radars (through the PSR and JAS programs).

History of Iraqis in Canada
While between 1945 and 1975, less than 200 Iraqis immigrated to Canada, between
1975 and 1992, 6,472 Iraqis immigrated to the country. According to the Canadian
Census, by 2006, approximately 29,950 individuals of Iraqi origin lived in Canada.43
This is a significant increase when compared to the 1991 Census, which recorded only
4,790 Iraqis in Canada. However, reports from community sources state that the Iraqi
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population in Canada in 1991 was already over 25,000.44 This discrepancy may be
due to the fact that many Iraqis, fearing retaliation from individuals still associated to
the Iraqi regime, concealed their true identity or Iraqi origin. Also, between the time
of publication of the 1991 census and the time that data from these community
sources was being collected,45 a considerable wave of Iraqis, mainly Shiites, arrived in
Canada during and after the Gulf War, due to the instability and continuing oppressive
climate in the country. Lastly, the discrepancy could also be attributed to the fact that
many Iraqis identified themselves to other groups, such as Assyrians, Chaldeans, and
Kurds, rather than only Iraqi.46

Gulf Wars and the increase of Iraqi resettlement to Canada
On August 2nd 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, after which the UN Security Council called
for an immediate withdrawal, and voted for Resolution 661, which imposed a range of
economic sanctions on Iraq. In January 1991, the first Gulf War began with a U.S.led offensive against Iraq. After four days of more intense ground operations in
February 1991, Kuwait was liberated, and Iraq later accepted the terms of a
ceasefire.47 Meanwhile, in Canada, resettlement operations for Iraqis began soon after
the beginning of the first Gulf War.

More than a decade after the First Gulf War ceasefire, in January 2002, President
George W. Bush listed Iraq as one of the ‘axes of evil’ in his weekly address to the
American public. In September of the same year, British Prime Minister Tony Blair
introduced documents allegedly proving that Iraq held within its borders weapons of
44
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mass destruction. UN weapons inspectors entered Iraq the following November, and
returned with no confirmation of such allegations. Despite this, the U.S. and its allies
launched another offensive in March 2003, and Saddam Hussein was later captured in
December of the same year.48

Between 1991 and 2005, Canada resettled a total of 15,975 Iraqis:
Table 1: Iraqis resettled to Canada since 1991*
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Iraqis Resettled
270
1,170
2,230
1,340
1,160
2,240
1,115
780
690
1,160

Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Iraqis Resettled
1,130
920
530
720
520
90**
900
2,134
3,900***

*Data for 1991 obtained from UNHCR. (2003a). Iraqi Refugees Around the World,
http://www.unhcr.org/3e79b00b9.pdf. Data for 1992 to 2006 obtained from UNHCR. (2007b).
Statistics on Displaced Iraqis Around The World, http://www.unhcr.org/cgiin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=461f7cb92. Data for 2007 to 2009 obtained from
Pressé, D. (2009). Ibid.
**2006 figure represents only the number of referrals submitted to Canada by UNHCR.
***2009 figure represents Canada’s projected number of Iraqis who were expected to be resettled in
2009. The total number of Iraqis resettled in 2009 was not yet made public at the time of writing.

As can be noticed in Table 1, the resettlement of Iraqis to Canada seemed to have
began approximately two years after the onset of the First Gulf War, and increased
again in 2000 following the Second Gulf War. Interestingly, however, it is only four
years after the onset of the 2003 war in Iraq – which resulted in more massive
population movements than the First and Second Gulf Wars combined49 – that
resettlement numbers began to increase again.
48
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Iraqis have since been fleeing their country in both steady flows and large waves, first
after the initial U.S.-led invasion of 2003, and also after the bombing of the Shia
Muslim Al Askari Mosque in Samarra in February 2006, which spurted increased
sectarian violence and population displacement.50 Meanwhile, although Canada had
resettled on average 1,170 Iraqis per year between 1992 and 2002, despite this
increased violence, instability, and population displacement in Iraq, only 530, 720,
and 520 Iraqis were resettled by Canada in 2003, 2004, 2005, respectively.51
Moreover, only 90 Iraqi refugees had been referred by UNHCR and resettled by
Canada by the end of 2006.52 Numbers of resettled Iraqis in Canada increased in 2007
with a total of 900 Iraqis being admitted to the country,53 and 2,134 more were
admitted in 2008.54 Finally, Canada expected to resettle a total of 3900 Iraqis over the
course of 2009.55

LITERATURE REVIEW
Refugee policies in Canada were first based on the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees that were both signed by Canada in
1969.56 However, it was only in 1978 that refugee determination decisions became
formal and non-discretionary, with the implementation of the Canadian Immigration
Act. In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada’s declared in the case of Singh et
al. v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) that a large part of the
50
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refugee protection system at the time was at odds with the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.57 It was following this ruling that the Immigration and Refugee Board
(IRB) was established. Created by the Parliament of Canada, the IRB is an
independent tribunal notably mandated to adjudicate all asylum claims registered in
Canada, as well as to receive appeals relating to immigration decisions, and orders for
removal.58 The IRB system underwent legislation changes in 1992 and 1995, and was
also later modified by the implementation of the 2002 IRPA. Above and beyond the
IRPA and 1951 Convention, also shaping Canada’s humanitarian obligations are the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as will later be
highlighted by those interviewed in the context of this study.

IHein59 identified national financial concerns as one of the influencing factors in
shaping a state’s refugee resettlement system. However, he also added that a
country’s foreign policy, as well as national public pressure may sway politicians on
one side or another and thus contribute in determining the country’s level of
commitment to refugee populations in need of resettlement.

Lippert60 looked into the changes in the Canadian refugee resettlement program from
the 1970s to the end of the 1990s. He found that the Canadian program shifted from
being based on principles of ‘liberal welfare’ from the 1970s to early 80s, to those he
describes as ‘advanced liberal’ from the early 80s and into the 90s. The initial goal of
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the Canadian refugee protection program when it took a more formal structure in the
1970s, according to Lippert, was to provide protection to individuals who were at risk
of being exposed to immediate physical danger or death through selection and refugee
status determination, and from moral and mental dangers through resettlement.61
Since the experience of the large-scale and high-cost resettlement program for the
Vietnamese boat people, which largely took place between the late 70s and early 80s,
Lippert reported that the Canadian government later became merely involved in
financing resettlement activities, rather than providing first-line services through its
governmental agencies, thus making the best use possible of low-cost or free services
offered by contracted Service Provider Organizations (SPOs) and their volunteers.

Lippert highlighted that Canada’s refugee program thus initially stemmed from social
sciences and humanitarian principles, and then moved towards a system that
prioritized accounting and cost-benefit analyses. This perspective regarding the move
away from humanitarian principles was also supported by Chimni,62 who argued that
“humanitarian factors do not shape the refugee policies of the dominant states in the
international system.” [emphasis added by the author] He claimed that there is a “need
to be alert to the non-humanitarian objectives which are pursued by these actors from
time to time behind the facade of humanitarianism.”63 According to Basok, in line
with both Lippert’s and Chimni’s perspectives, refugees were simply not viewed as
positively serving Canada’s economic interests, despite the fact that at the time of
Basok’s writing in 1996, refugees admitted to Canada (mainly of European origin),

61

Ibid., p.381.
Chimni, B.S. (2004) From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of
Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 23 (3), pp 55-73.
63
Lippert, R. Ibid. p.58.
62

19

did not differ considerably from those admitted under the economic migrant class in
terms of their socio-economic and demographic characteristics.64

Lippert also argued that this movement towards principles of ‘advanced welfare’ also
represented a move towards a more local type of management of the program, rather
than a centralized management associated with a liberal welfare system. He based his
interpretation of this shift in Canadian resettlement policy on his observation of an
increased trend of the Canadian government towards delegating settlement services to
SPOs and individual citizens, thus decentralizing the management of the resettlement
program to the provincial governments, and hence ‘de-responsibilizing’ the
government from the delivery of the program’s services. He also pointed to policies
put into place during the same period, which increased the level of responsibility put
on the refugees for assuming their own resettlement, by having them pay a 975$
landing fee required from all immigrants to Canada, in addition to the fee of 500$ for
the administrative processing of their landed immigrant status application. The Right
of Landing fee paid by incoming refugees was thus expected to account for over half
of the costs of the resettlement program incurred by the federal government,65
evidently taking away from the principle of providing humanitarian assistance to some
of the world’s most vulnerable people.

With regards to this observed decentralization of services and responsibilities,
however, Basok disagreed. She observed that despite appeared movement towards a
decentralization of responsibilities, civil and humanitarian groups defending the
interests of refugees had had no more than a minor impact on Canada’s refugee policy
64
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in the last 25 years. She argued that although the Canadian government may seemed
to have been decentralizing its services and decision powers in relation to refugee
resettlement, it was in fact retaining complete control over those who will be allowed
into Canada. She also argued that Canada had implemented more restrictive policies
in response to financial crises, increased xenophobia, and the idea held by some
members of the Canadian public that refugees significantly increase the strain on the
Canadian welfare system.66 She added: “[…] the state does not sacrifice its essential
interests, and organizes this support in order to attain national goals which serve the
fundamental long-run interests of the dominant group.”67 She also found that
although the government “will encourage some independent initiatives in the refugee
field, [it] will consistently interfere with both private sponsorships and [the
functioning of] the IRB.”68

Lippert had also highlighted the importance of the 1986 announcement that lead to the
creation of the IRB, in the hopes of having a Refugee Status Determination System
that would be removed from the influence of politics, and thus more independent and
impartial.69 However, despite these efforts, the IRB continued to be criticized for
being partial, and composed of political allies of the government in power at a given
time. The IRB has thus moved, over the last few years, from favoring political
nomination for its commissioners, to implementing a more thorough recruitment
system aimed at finding non-partisan, knowledgeable, experienced, and highly
qualified individuals who can demonstrate the ability to render decisions impartial to
the political agendas of any particular party or government. For the purpose of this
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research topic, although the asylum system is administratively separate from the
refugee resettlement system, the author argues that the context of the system of
asylum still indicates a tendency of the Canadian government towards, on the one
hand, attempting to de-politicize and/or privatize the Canadian refugee protection
system, and to distance itself from the ownership and liability of the program, and on
the other, keeping some level of control over the selection process of IRB
commissioners.

Before Lippert, however, Stein70 had highlighted in the early eighties that the context
in which the resettlement of approximately 1 million European refugees occurred
between 1947 and 1951, and which was overseen by the IRO at the time, was very
revealing. Stein notes that these refugees were accepted by the major resettlement
countries only after some difficult debates within these countries regarding their
domestic immigration policies,71 which were to be expected considering the
unprecedented magnitude of these resettlement operations. Even more, the IRO had
only been established by the United Nations as a temporary solution to the specific
refugee crisis Europe was faced with at the time.72 Thereafter, and until about 1975,
most countries managed the resettlement of refugees through ad hoc programs.
However, it is with the resettlement operations that affected over 1 million
Indochinese between 1975 and beyond Stein’s time of writing in 1983, that major
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resettlement countries at the time, such as the U.S., Australia, and Canada, began to
see the need for more permanent resettlement programs and policies.73

Global resettlement figures peeked in 1979 and 1980, Stein points out, but were found
to have drastically dropped over the subsequent years. He notes that in contrast to the
high number of resettled refugees in the mid-seventies and the early eighties, and to
the great ethnic diversity of these resettled groups, there was a perceptible decrease in
the commitment of traditional receiving countries towards resettlement towards the
tail end of this period. Following this active period of resettlement, he identified some
of the possible factors that could explain this decrease in commitment, such as: the
general public’s questioning of who is truly a refugee and who is truly deserving of
resettlement, poorer economic conditions in receiving countries including higher
unemployment, an overwhelming number of individuals who would potentially need
to be resettled, and the integration challenges experienced by some refugee
populations. Other factors that could explain a decrease in resettlement numbers, but
that did not necessarily imply a decrease in commitment, according to Stein, included:
the reduced numbers of refugees in the camps of first asylum in South East Asia; a
shift on the part of UNHCR and of other international organizations away from
resettlement, and towards voluntary repatriation or local integration; and an increased
willingness of countries of first asylum to allow for long-term hosting of refugee
populations.74
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Beiser75 argued that due to its intake of approximately 300,000 immigrants per year,
representing about 1% of its existing population, Canada has made immigration one of
its most debated issues, and greatest challenge. While refugees only represent a small
proportion of this quota (between 5 and 10%), Beiser observed that Canada prides
itself on treating refugees fairly and compassionately. He also argues, however, that
the limited amount of resources allocated to arrival and integration services do not
demonstrate such a commitment. Rather, the limited allocations of funding are more
of an indication that Canada may be admitting a certain number of refugees in order to
save its humanitarian reputation, a more instrumental objective, rather than
representing a trend towards the reproduction of truly humanitarian values and
continued humanitarian action. This argument by Beiser is also supported by
Neuwirth,76 who argued that refugee resettlement policies are moving towards being
completely shaped by foreign policies, and being informed by ‘calculated kindness’,
rather than intentions based on humanitarian principles. This perspective was also
supported by Loescher, who referred to “narrow self-interest calculations of sovereign
nation-states,”77 and that refugees at times are used as political pawns in the
government’s pursuit if its foreign policy agenda, and in the aim of “embarrassing or
destabilizing enemy governments.”78

Also according to Basok, the Canadian government had a considerable influence on
the ‘anti-refugee hysteria’ in Canada, feeding on the misconceptualization of refugees,
as simple economic migrants individuals aiming to take advantage of the Canadian
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systems.79 This misconceptualization led to the inclusion of particular elements in the
C-31 bill, which was found to favor the resettlement of refugees, its provisions at the
same time limited individuals’ access to the inland refugee determination system.80

Parallel shifts in the application of durable solutions and in the profile of refugees
resettled to Canada
Stein pointed out that a durable solution was initially meant to help “the refugees to
become self-sufficient, enabling them to integrate and participate fully in the social
and economic life of their new country, or their homeland if they repatriate.”81
However, he argued that resettlement was quickly moved to being considered as an
exceptional solution that should only be applied when the two other main solutions are
simply not possible, even for an undetermined, but likely long period of time. Stein
denotes a ‘tug’ in the context of refugee resettlement programs between a state’s
willingness and moral obligations to intervene in refugee-producing emergencies, and
its wish to establish a controlled and regularized system to manage resettlement
programs. He argues that while states attempt to establish programs that would allow
for a regular flow of refugee resettlement, there is of course no such thing as regular
and predictable production of refugee flows. 82

Regarding this context and shift from prioritizing resettlement to designating
voluntary repatriation and local integration as the preferred solutions to refugee crises,
Chimni presumed that “since refugees from the South were now making their way to
the North, and since there was at present no shortage of labour, it was time [for the
resettlement community] to rethink the solution of resettlement in other than the
79
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limited Cold War context.”83 Chimni thus assumed that the resettlement community,
here including the major countries of resettlement and UNHCR, was suddenly no
longer ready to consider mass resettlement operations an option for refugees of nonEuropean origins. Moreover, Chimni emphasized that although UNHCR claimed
there was not enough scholarly work that had looked into voluntary repatriation as a
durable solution to refugee problems, the UNHCR Executive Committee proceeded to
adopt in 1985, without further scholarly studies on the topic, a key conclusion on
voluntary repatriation which urged the international community to consider this
strategy as a preferred durable solution to refugee problems.84,85 Advocates of
voluntary repatriation thus made the assumption that all refugees wished to return
home, without ever verifying if such an assumption was accurate for some, most or all
of the refugees of the world.86

From the early 1990s to the early years of 2000, Casasola also noted a shift in the
profile of the refugees resettled by Canada. The resettlement of individuals with
special needs – such as women at risk, elderly refugees, and some with medical needs
– increased from 89 individuals in 1996, to over 550 individuals in 2000. In addition,
while there was no legislation to this effect, Canadian visa officers were reported to
have decreases the application of the ‘ability to establish’ criterion. In addition, the
region of origin of the resettled refugees also shifted from Europe in the 1990s, to
Africa and the Middle East at the beginning of 2000.87 Basok added that those
resettled in the 1990s were also no longer originating from states determined by
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Canada as representing ideological enemies; refugees could no longer be used as
political pawns, and would be seen as merely burdens to state.88

Medical and security checks – causing limited access and delay
Casasola also identified security and medical screening procedures as considerably
limiting those admissible for resettlement to Canada. While UNHCR will already
execute one level of security screening by applying the exclusions outlined in the
1951 Convention, Canada will still refuse some UNHCR-referred cases based on
security grounds – cases that are at times subsequently accepted by the United States
or the Netherlands. This is in addition to the fact that Canada was also found to be
slow in conducting its security reviews, which created additional delays in the
resettlement operations. Casasola also warned that Canada’s medical restrictions
should make sure to only limit access to those who could legitimately cause a threat to
the health of the Canadian public,89 and that medical requirements should be
consistent across all resettlement countries, to reduce on the costs of the countries’
respective medical screening processes, and on the time spent by UNHCR to meet
each and every one’s medical and security requirements.90

Resettlement models
Lanphier,91 on the other hand, compared four different types of refugee resettlement
models: 1) a high volume of resettlement with a focus on economic integration, 2) a
smaller volume of resettlement with a focus on economic integration, 3) a smaller
volume of resettlement with a focus on cultural adaptation, and 4) a high volume of
88
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resettlement with a focus on cultural adaptation. Below is a graphic summarizing
Lanphier’s Four types of resettlement models:

Figure 1: Lanphier’s Four Resettlement Models

The first model, according to Lanphier, represents more closely the American model
of resettlement, whereby a large number of individuals are resettled, and are expected
to integrate the host country’s economy as soon as possible. The second model,
according to Lanphier, represents the Canadian or French model of resettlement. It
should be noted that the resettlement numbers of France today are in no way
comparable to those of Canada, amounting only to a few hundred per year, compared
to over 10,000 for Canada. However, Lanphier argues that their integration aims are
comparable, i.e. with a focus on the resettled refugees’ quick integration to the
economy, rather than a focus on assisting them with their cultural adaptation. The
third model, Lanphier argues, is most representative of the resettlement and
integration objectives of Quebec, a French-speaking province in Canada, which for its
immigrants and refugees will greatly emphasize instruction on the province’s history
and culture, as well as the Quebec’s society common values. Although an ideal
humanitarian refugee resettlement system would be imagined to yield high
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resettlement numbers, and focus on both the economic and cultural adaptation of the
refugee, as described by model 4, Lanphier found that such a model was simply not
sustainable. Rather, he found that a smaller volume of resettlement would better
allow for a focus on either economic adaptation (such as is the case for the Canadian
and French resettlement programs) or on cultural adaptation (such as is the case with
Quebec’s resettlement program). With these models, Lanphier argues that refugee
resettlement programs become instrumental in shaping a state’s broader social
policies.92

Canada’s focus on economic integration and its lower intake of refugees for
resettlement described by Lanphier in 2003 thus goes in line Lippert’s observation in
1998 of the Canadian resettlement program having moved towards being more of an
advanced welfare system, focusing on lower, but manageable numbers, and
prioritizing swift economic integration of the incoming refugees, through personalized
services offered by a range of organizations outside of the governmental system.

However, would such a description accurately describe the Canadian resettlement
today, focusing more on the economic integration, rather than the cultural integration
of its resettled refugees? The author would argue more emphasis would be placed
today on the cultural integration of refugees, and of all other types of migrants, in a
similar way than what had been done in the province of Quebec. Quebec’s system
being more focused on the cultural integration its of new migrants, in practice, has,
over time, focused more than other regions of the country on the refugees’ language
skills (French language skills in the case of Quebec), as well as increasing new
migrants’ knowledge of Quebec politics, history, and culture. With the entry into
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power of the Conservative government at the federal level in 2006, similar objectives
have been voiced by CIC Minister, Jason Kenney, concerning new migrants’ civic
responsibility to learn one of the two official languages, and to expand the level of
knowledge on Canadian history and politics that would be necessary to succeed in
their Canadian citizenship examination.93 Economic integration, then, has come to be
seen as insufficient. Migrants of all categories, including refugees, are now expected
by the Canadian Government to fully blend into their new society.

Could this also mean a shift from an integrationist, to an assimilationist immigration
system in Canada? These few past decades of the government’s laisser-faire
approach, which devoted limited funding to SPOs and put pressure on these
organizations to encourage migrants to become independent from public assistance
and enter the labor market and as quickly as possible, may now bring the government
to realize that swift economic integration may not be sufficient. It is insufficient,
according to the Canadian government, if migrants are found to not have learned a
sufficient level English or French that would allow them to work at an equivalent
level on the job market than what they experienced in their countries of origin – work
deemed equivalent to their level of education and previous work experience. It could
also be considered insufficient if the refugee is not able to attain a certain level on the
job market in order to perhaps bring to the economy at least the equivalent in the
public funds invested in his or her resettlement to Canada.
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Finally, regarding resettlement numbers, Cochetel94 reported that Canada determined
its resettlement capacity to be of 6,140 GARs for 2008 (representing 0.018% of its
population95). This was in comparison to the U.S.’s determined capacity of 50,000
(representing 0.016% of its population96), and Australia’s capacity of 6,000
(representing 0.028% of its population97). The global resettlement capacity of all
receiving countries combined thus amounted to 69,610 refugees in 2008. Cochetel
stated that although the number of resettlement countries and their allocated
resettlement spaces were increasing, it still did not match the current resettlement
needs of the world’s refugee population, as per UNHCR’s assessment of global
resettlement needs. He also warned that the gap between resettlement needs and
states’ declared capacities was likely to increase. As mentioned above, the
resettlement needs of Iraqis alone were assessed by UNHCR to be of approximately
60,000 in early 2009.

Thus, in light of these authors’ observations and findings, the author aimed to
document more current views and perspectives – from the Canadian government
itself, and related non-governmental partners and individuals – on the Canadian
resettlement system as it is today. As resettlement was seen as more of a key durable
solution before the 1990s, much more writing could be found on this topic before this
date, while considerably less in the 1990s and thereafter when voluntary repatriation
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and local integration became the preferred solutions to refugee crises. Resettlement
operations, however, are still associated with considerable costs invested by receiving
states, in comparison to the funds allocated to the implementation of the two other
main durable solutions.

A number of questions, however, are not addressed by previously cited authors.
Beyond the determination of a yearly resettlement ceiling, the interest of this thesis
was to reveal more in-depth details about how Canadian resettlement policies are
initiated, developed, and implemented. The meeting evidence of the Standing
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration relating to Iraqi refugees available on the
Parliament of Canada website showcases how different groups come to advocate and
defend their perspective relating to the cause of Iraqi refugees.98 However, what is
not related in these public materials is how the Committee will come to a particular
conclusion on, in this case, the Iraqi Refugee situation, how this conclusion is
conveyed to the CIC Minister and others, and how the views of the committee affect
the policy-making process relating to Iraqi refugees. The questions asked to those
interviewed were: what is influencing the Canadian government to resettle the number
of refugees, and more particularly the number of Iraqis, it chooses to resettle every
year? Is the government most influenced by UNHCR’s assessment of the Iraqis’
needs for resettlement? How is the level of funding for resettlement determined every
year, and what proportion of these resources will be allocated to the resettlement of
Iraqi refugees? How are policies shaped with reference to all refugees resettled to
Canada? What about Iraqi refugees in particular?
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Prior to commencing field research, it was the author’s observation that the reactions
of the Canadian general public (expressing different opinions through public media
such as the newspapers, radio, television, etc.) and of the local and international NGO
representatives to a high or low level of overall refugee intake, or the intake or a
specific refugee group, will often play a critical role in how resettlement policies are
shaped. The strength of these reactions may be due to the possibility that the
Canadian policy-making process, in this case relating to Canada’s resettlement of
refugees, may lack some clarity, and perhaps even transparency. The aim of this
research is thus to take a close look at the process of policy-making relating to refugee
resettlement in Canada, and at the various sources of influences – economic, legal or
humanitarian, and political – that shape these policies, in order to attempt to illuminate
the opacity that seems to be attached to them, and to the policy-making system
relating to the resettlement of refugees to Canada.
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES
Over the course of the research for this thesis, the author sought to understand the
process of policy-making in relation to the Canadian Refugee Resettlement Program,
and more specifically, to the resettlement of Iraqi refugees. One of the goal of the
research was to describe and help all actors’ understanding of each other’s vision of
the program, what they understood to be the program’s goals, and the means to reach
these goals. One of the end goals of the author was to increase the conciliation
between these actors’ visions, and in turn attempt to have all major actors work in a
roughly common direction, for the benefit of those in need of protection on a global
scale.

To understand this process, the initial aim was to look into the following categories of
possible influences on this policy-making process: legal and humanitarian influences,
economic influences, and international and domestic political influences. While
considering these influences, it was important to better understand the policy-making
process involved in determining yearly resettlement quotas and ceilings, most
particularly regarding the Iraqi refugee population since 2003.

Clarification was obtained on the types of influences on the Canadian resettlement
program through Internet research, and by interviewing concerned actors in Canada.
These actors were considered best to be able to offer expert perspectives and opinions
on the topic at hand. Although some of the data collected was obtained from
anonymous actors in the field who were knowledgeable on the research topic, the
main informants for this research were:
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1- Ms. Debra Pressé, Director of the Resettlement Division, Refugees Branch,
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Ottawa
2- Mr. Michael Casasola, Resettlement Officer, UNHCR Ottawa
3- Ms. Glynis Williams, Member of the Canadian Council for Refugees and
Director of Action Réfugiés Montréal
4- Ms. Grace Wu, Refugee Coordinator, Amnesty International-Canada, Toronto
5- Mr. Jalal Saeed and colleagues, Iraqi Federation of Refugees, Toronto
6- Mr. Moayed Altalibi, Iraqi Community Centre of Montreal

PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES
MS. DEBRA PRESSÉ, DIRECTOR, RESETTLEMENT DIVISION, REFUGEES BRANCH, CIC,
OTTAWA, CANADA , INTERVIEWED 15 JULY 200999
Establishing contact with Ms. Pressé
Ms. Pressé was initially introduced to the author in January 2009, through
professional networking. Her contact was obtained through previous professional
contacts from the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and
Migration. Contact with Ms. Pressé was re-initiated in the summer of 2009 in the
context of this research project. Ms. Pressé was identified as a potential interviewee
interviewed in the context of this research as she was considered to be a key expert,
with regard to her direct involvement in the policy-making process relating to the
Canadian Refugee Resettlement Program.

Interviewee’s profile
Ms. Pressé is a very knowledgeable contributor in her field. On many instances in the
context of this research project, as well as in the author’s socio-professional
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networking process, Ms. Pressé’s name was mentioned along with comments that
indicated a considerable level of respect for her knowledge on, and dedication to,
Canada’s refugee program, as well as global refugee issues. The comments received
about Ms. Pressé were always indicative of the fact that although the Minister of
Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism did not seem to prioritize the
protection of refugees and others in need of protection, that to the contrary, Ms. Pressé
and other government staff within CIC were found to strongly support the cause of
refugees, and do everything in their power to make the best of the Canadian Refugee
Resettlement Program, with the resources made available to their Division.

Ms. Pressé offered a wealth of information on the functioning of the resettlement
program, and made sure to address all of the questions presented. The input provided
by Ms. Pressé is that of a civil servant to the Government of Canada; although Ms.
Pressé was able to provide a good amount of information on the topic at hand, she was
of course limited to disclose only information she felt could be presented in the public
arena. At one point, the interviewer was asked by Ms. Pressé to turn off the recorder,
where Ms. Pressé passed on speculative information regarding a particular budgeting
decision that had yet to be confirmed.

Other CIC representatives abroad were also considered, such as CIC Damascus.
However, after interviewing Ms. Pressé, it was felt that the information received was
all that would be made available on the part of CIC (considering usual part-lines
offered by governmental departments), and that further exploration within this
governmental department would not bring more insight into the topic at hand.
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It was thus because of the limitations faced by Ms. Pressé as a government
representative that it was decided to obtain the perspectives of other actors in the field,
in order to attempt to draw a more complete picture of the different influences on the
refugee resettlement policy-making process in Canada.

MR. MICHAEL CASASOLA, RESETTLEMENT OFFICER, UNHCR OTTAWA, CANADA,
INTERVIEWED ON 15 JULY 2009100
Establishing contact with Mr. Casasola
Previous contact had already been made with Mr. Casasola in the process of
professional networking. Mr. Casasola was keen on meeting and providing all
necessary background information. Preliminary research showed that UNHCR played
a central role in Canada’s process of policy-making relating to all refugee issues, and
that Mr. Casasola was the main interlocutor between UNHCR Ottawa and CIC, the
CCR, and other stakeholders.

Context of interview and nature of UNHCR-Canada relationship
The interview with UNHCR was the only one out of the six interviews carried out in
the context of this thesis research for which permission to record the interview was
denied by the interviewee. It was sensed that the UNHCR representative was very
wary of possibility that statements made could be used out of context, and thus
compromise UNHCR’s delicate diplomatic relationship with Canada, or more
specifically with CIC.

The nature of the relationship between UNHCR and the Government of Canada was
made evident when UNHCR explained why they had not clearly stated the need for
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Canada to increase the resettlement of Iraqis, and to increase the overall funding for
refugee assistance on a global scale. In relation to Canada, and it is also assumed, in
relation to other major donors, UNHCR can only but demonstrate gratitude for their
voluntary contributions. Considering the principle of state sovereignty, and the fact
that refugee resettlement or any other humanitarian initiative is voluntary, UNHCR
considers it is not easily possible for them to express that Canada’s contributions may
not be sufficient. Rather, there can be only a respectful mention of the fact that
further contributions from the Government of Canada would be greatly appreciated.

UNHCR has thus very little room to maneuver with regards to its relationship to
Canada. This seems to often be the case not with Canada, but with many or most
countries where UNHCR is considered merely as a guest, and must thus walk a very
thin diplomatic line in the context of its interactions with the host state. Despite this
context, UNHCR’s relationship with Canada was still qualified as very positive by
both UNHCR and CIC. Casasola was thus speaking to the author as a loyal
representative of UNHCR, and a loyal partner to CIC, and therefore had even less
liberty in expressing his views than did Ms. Pressé from CIC. However, Casasola still
offered a valuable perspective of context that framed Canada’s policy-making with
regards to resettlement.

MS. GLYNIS WILLIAMS, CCR, ACTION RÉFUGIÉS MONTREAL, AND FORMER ICMC
DEPLOYEE TO UNHCR SYRIA, INTERVIEWED IN MONTREAL, CANADA, INTERVIEWED
101
ON 28 JULY, 2009
Establishing contact with Ms. Williams
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The author was initially intending to interview the Executive Director of the Canadian
Council for Refugees (CCR), Ms. Janet Dench. Due to Ms. Dench’s unavailability at
the suggested interview date, the author was referred to Ms. Williams instead. CCR
was initially expected to be a key organization to interview in the context of this
research, due to the fact that it is one of the main and largest advocacy groups in
Canada concerned with refugee protection and asylum issues. CIC considered that
CCR rarely missed an opportunity to remind them of their obligations, of refugees’
and asylum seekers’ rights, and of highly vulnerable individuals or groups in the
world who would be in need of Canada’s assistance. It was therefore considered
essential to interview CCR in the context of this thesis research, in order to potentially
obtain contrasting perspectives on the subject.

Profile of Ms. Williams
The interview with Ms. Williams generated unforeseen benefits: she appeared before
the Standing Committee for Immigration and Citizenship in 2008, along with the
former president of CCR, to appeal to Canadian Government to raise its level of
commitment to the alleviation of the Iraqi refugee crisis. Her long-standing
membership to CCR, her role as the director of Action Réfugiés Montréal (ARM), and
her experience in the joint UNHCR-ICMC (International Catholic Migration
Commission) Resettlement Deployment Scheme in Syria in the spring of 2007, made
her a key expert on the research topic. These organizations and initiatives are
described below.

CCR is “a non-profit umbrella organization committed to the rights and protection of
refugees in Canada and around the world and to the settlement of refugees and
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immigrations in Canada.”102 Described by CIC as its watchdog,103 CCR is always at
the forefront of all refugee issues in Canada in particular, and routinely sought by CIC
and the Canadian media to offer its perspective on any given issue relating to refugee
protection or immigration. However, CCR is considered by CIC to be mainly an
advocacy group that may not represent the views of the public, while member
organizations and individuals consider CCR as an essential entity, without which the
voices of the refugees would not be heard, and their rights and dignity not respected.
ARM, on the other hand, is a non-profit organization associated to the Anglican
Diocese of Montreal, and one of few organizations in the province of Quebec
involved in private sponsorship of refugees. Lastly, the UNHCR-ICMC Resettlement
Deployment Scheme, is a UNHCR-initiated program meant to help respond to the
important staffing needs related to the process of interviewing and referral of refugees
to various resettlement countries.104 ICMC deployees such as Ms. Williams work
along side direct staff of the UNHCR to assist with various aspects of UNHCR
Missions’ operations. Williams worked with UNHCR Damascus as a resettlement
officer, interviewing Iraqi refugees to determine whether they could be referred for
resettlement to various countries.

With all these associations, Ms. Williams represented a key source of information in
the context of this research project. She had first hand experience with Iraqis in Syria,
as well as with resettled refugees and asylum seekers in Canada. She thus also had a
thorough understanding of UNHCR’s refugee resettlement system, as well as of the
PSR program in Canada.
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In her different roles and capacities, unlike Ms. Pressé from CIC and Mr. Casasola
from UNHCR, Williams did not have any concerns about disclosing any particular
type of information or perspective. She was able to offer the most wide-reaching and
‘uncensored’ opinions and observations relating to the questions at hand. Although
CCR is generally critical of decisions and policies of the Canadian government
relating to refugees, Williams, although critical as well, demonstrated a broad
understanding of the system, of the issues at hand, and of the misconceptions held by
different actors placed at different levels in the system.

MS. GRACE WU, REFUGEE COORDINATOR, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL-CANADA,
TORONTO, CANADA, INTERVIEWED ON 20 JULY, 2009105
Establishing contact with Ms. Wu
The author was initially referred to Amnesty International-Canada by CCR. CCR
suggested meeting with Ms. Gloria Nafziger, a Refugee Coordinator for AIC known
for her knowledge on Iraqi refugee issues, especially after participating in a factfinding mission to the Middle East, and visiting Palestinian-Iraqi camps near the IraqiSyrian border. However, Nafziger not being available on the suggested interview
date, one of Nafziger Amnesty colleagues, Ms. Wu, spoke to the author. AIC was
expected to offer a perspective that would be between that of CCR and UNHCR –
more moderate than that CCR’s, although less constrained than UNHCR’s.

Profile of Ms. Wu
Ms. Wu was not as well informed on Iraqi refugee issues as originally hoped. AIC is
generally not involved in resettlement, other than when the situation is considered to
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be an emergency, such as was the case for the Iraqi refugee population, on which Ms.
Nafziger would have been more knowledgeable. However, Ms. Wu was able to share
her knowledge on the general responsiveness of Canadian government workers, and
lack thereof of Canadian politicians with regards to issues touching refugee
resettlement or the rights of those in need of protection.

Wu was in a similar position than UNHCR’s Casasola, in that she had to remain
discrete in the expression of her views, considering that these could later be used to
misrepresent the larger Amnesty International organization. AIC’s relationship with
the Canadian government seemed more delicate than that of CCR and CIC, although
less than that of UNHCR and the Canadian government. Wu’s words seemed to be at
time calculated, although she did not hesitate to express her views about the current
Minister’s, or the current government’s resistance to listen to appeals relating to those
in need of protection and support.

MR. MOAYED ALTALIBI, IRAQI COMMUNITY CENTER OF MONTREAL (ICC), CANADA,
INTERVIEWED ON 28 JULY, 2009106
Establishing contact with the ICC
The ICC was located through the Internet. The aim of interviewing the ICC was to
gather the perspective of the Iraqi community in Canada regarding the Iraqi refugee
crisis, and Canada’s response to it, or lack thereof. Mr. Altalibi was the former
president of, and current consultant for, the ICC.

ICC profile
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The ICC was founded in 1986, and was working at a very low profile at the time due
to the fact that most Iraqis were fearful of Saddam Hussein’s regime, even while
residing permanently in Canada. They knew that if they were known to help regime
dissidents, refugees, or asylum seekers, this would put them and their families in Iraq
at risk. However, since the fall of the regime in 2003, the centre was revived, and has
been involved in the private sponsorship of Iraqis to Canada, as well as in providing
services for government-assisted Iraqis arriving in Montreal.

Concerning the fears of the community towards the previous Iraqi regime, Mr.
Altalibi considered that a good number of Iraqis are still afraid to use their real names,
and still afraid of the remaining elements of the regime.107 Altalibi himself came to
Canada as an economic migrant, and has been established in Canada for over 20
years. Contrary to others in Montreal’s Iraqi community, he did not fear reprisals on
himself or his family based on his involvement within the Iraqi community in Canada,
and his organizations’ assistance to Iraqi refugees. Altalibi was thus very candid
about his opinion on the Iraqi situation, and on his perspective of whether Canada was
meeting its obligation towards the Iraqi refugee population.
IRAQI FEDERATION OF REFUGEES (IFR), TORONTO, CANADA, INTERVIEWED ON 20
JULY, 2009108
Interviewees
•

Mr. Jalal Saeed, President of the IFR

•

Mr. Hassan Mashkoor, Member of IFR and Board of Directors of the Iraqi
Canadian Society

•

Ms. Lina Alipour, IFR receptionist, secretary, and researcher
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Establishing contact with the IFR
Mr. Jaleel’s contact information was also passed on to the author by the CCR. Upon
arrival at the meeting, two other IFR members demonstrated their interest in
participating in the interview.

Profile of the IFR
The IFR was originally founded in London, United Kingdom, in 1991, while the
Canadian branch was established in 1995. The main activities of the Canadian branch
at the time were mostly to support the international federation in its campaign to
advocate in the interest of Iraqi refugees in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey.109 The
main objective of the IFR in Canada today is to appeal to the government or to
different organizations to help Iraqi refugees, and to support the Iraqi population in
Canada. IFR is a self-funded organization, working only with volunteers, and is the
first Iraqi community organization in Canada that supports solely Iraqi issues. It is
also involved in private sponsorships, assisting the Iraqi community in preparing and
submitting PSR applications.110

The IFR is thus regularly approached by the Canadian media regarding questions such
as how Iraqi resettlement numbers can be increased, and why Canada is taking less
Iraqis than the United States, among others.111

The three IFR interviewees did not have uniform perspectives. Mr. Saeed’s position
was that the Canadian government was not resettling enough Iraqi refugees, and that
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the few who were resettled were not sufficiently supported by Canada – financially
and otherwise. On the other hand, Saeed’s colleague, Mr. Mashkoor, felt that Iraqi
refugees do not need to be resettled in greater numbers. Rather, he felt that they
should remain as much as possible in the region, in order to be able to easily return
when Iraq’s security situation stabilizes. It was evident that the interviewees had not
consulted each other much or at all regarding previously communicated research
questions, and regarding the possibility of presenting a unified voice. Mr. Mashrook’s
position was that the Canadian refugee program could serve a useful purpose for only
a small number of refugees in desperate situations, and that for the most part, all
resettlement programs – Canada’s and others’ – were used by individuals who were
more economic migrants than individuals in desperate need of protection. Mashrook
felt that Canada’s support would be better placed if it was invested in the Iraqi
infrastructure and economy, in accelerating the rebuilding of Iraq, improving the
general situation of Iraq, and thus allowing the Iraqi refugee and expatriate population
to return. A mass population return sometime in the future, in his perspective, would
be ideal, and would only seem possible if the bulk of the Iraqi refugees remain in the
Middle East region.

INTERVIEW GUIDES
Interviewees were presented with a set of questions that were developed specifically
according to their expected fields of expertise (see Appendix).

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although interview consent forms were not used in the context of the research for this
thesis, the author gave the interviewees the opportunity to confirm the accuracy of
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their statements used in the thesis before its submission. Four interviewees took this
opportunity and requested for the author to modify, add, or remove some of their
statements. Some of these requests were due to some inaccuracies in the statements,
which may have occurred in the process of the transcribing the interview notes and
recordings. Other requests were based on the fact that the interviewees did not wish
for their statements to be included in the thesis, for fear that these could become
public, and potentially negatively affect their work.
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CHAPTER 3: CIC RESETTLEMENT POLICIES AND THE CASE OF IRAQI
REFUGEES: FACTORS IMPACTING THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES TO BE
RESETTLED TO CANADA
FOUR POLICY PILLARS OF RESETTLEMENT112,113
The Canadian government’s decisions related to its yearly resettlement targets are said
to be mainly based on the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the
Canadian government’s humanitarian objectives, the protection needs of refugee
populations or of populations in refugee-like situations, as identified by UNHCR, and
on UNHCR’s capacity and resources in the potential target source countries or
countries of asylum.114

Four policy pillars guide the global resettlement community – i.e., the resettlement
states, and UNHCR – in their assessments and decision-making process. These policy
pillars are: the use of resettlement as an individual protection tool, resettlement as a
possible mechanism to share global responsibilities, resettlement as a durable solution,
and finally, the strategic use of resettlement, a more recent pillar only beginning to
gain traction, and being particularly supported by Canada.115,116

1- Resettlement as an individual protection tool
CIC considers resettlement first and foremost as an individual protection tool used for
refugee persons or refugee groups in situations of serious physical risk. UNHCR will
generally urge all resettlement countries to select the most vulnerable individuals,
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such as those whose lives are at risk, and those who have critical levels of physical
protection needs.

2- Resettlement as a durable solution
In the majority of the cases, resettlement will be offered to individuals who would not
otherwise have access to a solution that could end their state of asylum. Such possible
durable solutions include permanent integration to the country of asylum, or a return
to the individual’s country of origin. Assessing whether resettlement is the only
durable solution available to the individual is one of the main components of the
assessment conducted by UNHCR, and later by Canadian immigration officers. In the
case of the PSR program, the CIC officer will be the one determining whether
resettlement is the only durable solution available to the applicant, after determining if
the individual meets the refugee definition, and can be admitted to Canada under the
full responsibility of his or her private sponsors.

3- Strategic use of resettlement
Resettlement is also used by Canada and its resettlement partners as a strategy to
alleviate some of the numerous outcomes of refugee crises. In 2003, the international
community defined the strategic use of resettlement as resettlement activity leading to
planned direct and indirect benefits accruing to refugees not being resettled. Thus, the
strategy does not attempt to resettle as many refugees as possible, but rather, to
resettle specific portions of a given refugee population in order to derive benefits for
the non-resettled refugees of the same caseload in a given camp, city, or country.
Resettlement can be used to reduce the pressures on a given country of asylum, and
encourage these asylum countries to keep their borders open to future refugee flows.
Resettlement operations in such circumstances also potentially allow for a larger
48

number of refugees to benefit from previously over-strained resources in the place of
asylum, and also perhaps encourage other resettlement countries to begin or increase
their own resettlement operations. This strategy aims to make of resettlement an
effective and efficient tool for the benefit of all parties concerned – the countries of
resettlement, the country of asylum, and the refugee populations themselves.117

Canada has been a promoter of the strategic use of resettlement. It continues to
support the ideas set out in the Multilateral Framework of Understandings on
Resettlement, including the strategic use of resettlement, and seeks out opportunities
to apply them. In addition, Canada has also been focusing on addressing Protracted
Refugee Situations through this strategy.118

The strategic use of resettlement, as it was originally intended, was notably applied in
the contexts of Nepal, Thailand, as well as in the case of the resettlement of a group of
Somali refugees residing in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. Upon the initial proposal
of the latter resettlement project by UNHCR, Canada and Australia committed to
resettling all members of the one specific Somali clan. This clan had been facing ongoing and targeted persecution in the camp; the limited resources available at the
camp were thus absorbed by the extensive efforts made to protect and attend to the
members of this specific group. Although Canada in this instance only resettled 600
persons, when added to the resettlement commitments of Australia, this strategy
succeeded in allowing for more individuals to benefit from the limited camp services
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available, and for the UNHCR protection officers to have more time to focus on other
vulnerable persons residing in the camp.119

4- Resettlement as a way to share responsibility
One of the foundations of the Canadian Refugee Resettlement program is the principle
of responsibility sharing.120 Canada aims to use resettlement to alleviate the human
and financial costs, as well as the pressures of refugee influxes on major asylum
countries’ economies and infrastructure. It is the main reason why Canada committed
to resettle Iraqis out of the Middle East, Afghan refugees from Pakistan, Iran, the
former Soviet Union (and others especially since 2004121), and the Colombians since
1988.

Based on this principle, the plight of Colombians’ is considered to be one of Canada’s
most pressing responsibilities in terms of refugee protection. This is especially
considering the fact that Canada will systematically plead for European countries to
accept refugees from their own region. CIC thus confirmed that “it is incumbent upon
us to take Colombians” in the spirit of responsibility sharing, and considering the fact
that Colombian refugees constitute the largest displaced population in the Western
hemisphere.122

Canada thus prioritizes strategies that alleviate refugee situations worldwide, such as
through its membership to a working group on resettlement, and its involvement in the
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resettlement of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal, and of the Iraqi refugees in the Middle
East.123

Another context in which resettlement was used to share responsibility was in Turkey.
While Turkey ratified the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, it has retained the
geographical limitations of Article 1B(1) of the Convention, which only committed it
to accepting refugees whose fear of persecution originated from events that occurred
on European territory. According to the country’s 1994 Asylum Regulation, Turkey
will only grant temporary asylum to non-Europeans who meet the 1951 refugee
definition while they await resettlement to a safe third country.124 The Turkish
government thus accepts to leave its borders open to more asylum seekers, under the
condition that other countries such as Canada accept to resettle some of the
Convention Refugees on its territory.125

Perspectives on CIC’s claims relating to responsibility sharing
Some of those interviewed felt that Canada was in fact not accomplishing its fair
share, considering most particularly the fact that Sweden had managed to resettle
more Iraqis than both Canada and the U.S. combined.126 Some felt that if Canada did
carry its fair share, it was only in certain circumstances: either in situations that
seemed highly expedient, or where operations were initiated by the UNHCR. A
special UN-led initiative, however, did not automatically imply Canadian
involvement; Canada at times would choose to opt-in or opt-out of UN-led
resettlement operations. Canada may act independently from UNHCR through the
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resettlement of PSRs, an activity that does not require the presence of UNHCR or of
any resettlement operation in the given country of asylum.127

Application of the four policy pillars of resettlement in relation to Iraqi resettlement
It is partly with the strategic use of resettlement in mind, as well as with the principle
of responsibility sharing, that UNHCR appealed to resettlement countries to partake in
the large-scale resettlement of Iraqis in the Middle East. Considering the size of the
Iraqi refugee population, which stood at approximately 2.5 million in 2007, the
strategy consisted in resettling only a portion of this population, in order to keep
neighboring countries such as Syria and Jordan open to receiving more asylum
seekers.128

When compared to the countries hosting the largest numbers of the world’s refugee
population, however, it was felt that Canada was not assuming its fair share of
responsibility with regards to the global refugee population, and that between 2003
and 2007, more should have been done for Iraqi refugees on the part of Canada. It
was four years after the onset of Iraqi crisis that UNHCR officially concluded that the
refugee flow would not be temporary. Until this assessment was made, UNHCR’s
strategy was one of containment, where it would not promote resettlement, in order to
avoid a pull factor to the countries of asylum where resettlement would be taking
place, nor would it encourage voluntary return, due to the worsening security situation
in Iraq at the time.129
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Thus, during this period preceding the beginning of major UNHCR resettlement
operations in 2007, private sponsors in Canada had submitted a number of cases to be
considered for resettlement. Cases that seemed to meet the criteria were denied
resettlement by CIC. When some of these cases were submitted to CIC for
reconsideration after 2007, many were approved. It was assumed that CIC officers
interviewing from Damascus and other locations in the Middle East region must have
been aware of the situation in Iraq itself, and of the growing tensions and pressures in
the countries of asylum. Considering this, it was felt that criteria for inadmissibility,
such as temporary reavailment, were strictly applied by overseas visa officers prior to
2007 to support the rejection of these cases.130 It was thus felt that Canada could have
found different avenues to be more generous and open, and that its lack to do so
demonstrated a lack of political will.131

CIC’S ESTABLISHMENT OF RESETTLEMENT PRIORITIES
Sixteen countries worldwide have refugee resettlement programs with yearly quotas,
which together make a total of 79,000 resettlement spaces available yearly.132 In
contrast, UNHCR has assessed that over 500,000 individuals yearly are in situations
of asylum where resettlement would represent their only possible durable solution.
Considering this gap between resettlement needs and resettlement spaces made
available, potential receiving countries must make their own assessment of which
individuals will be considered as priority in the context of their resettlement
program.133
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Table 2: CIC’s Past Resettlement Priorities – Top Ten

2004

2005

2006

2007

Afghanistan
Colombia
Sudan

17% Afghanistan
14% Colombia
11% Sudan

23% Colombia
16% Afghanistan
9% Ethiopia

Ethiopia
Iraq**
Iran

8% Ethiopia
6% Iraq
6% Liberia

8% Sudan
5% Iran
4% DR Congo

7% Iraq
5% Ethiopia
5% Somalia

9% Myanmar
7% Ethiopia
6% DR Congo

8%
8%
7%

DR Congo
Somalia
Liberia

5% DR Congo
4% Somalia
3% Iran

4% Myanmar
3% Somalia
3% Iraq

5% DR Congo
4% Eritrea
4% Sudan

6% Somalia
4% Eritrea
3% Iran

6%
5%
3%

Sierra Leone
Other

3% Tajikistan
22% Other

10,526

2% Thailand
23% Other

10,400

18% Afghanistan
18% Myanmar
9% Colombia

2008
18% Iraq
16% Colombia
15% Afghanistan

20%
15%
13%

3% Iran

3% Sudan

3%

24% Other

13% Other

12%

10,663

11,152

10,804*

Obtained from CIC. (2009a). Resettlement – One Durable Solution in the Global Refugee Protection
Regime, Presentation for the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, June 2009, p.15.
*Projected numbers
** Emphasis on Iraq data added by the author

Sixty-nine different nationalities of refugees were resettled by Canada in 2008. For
2009, Canada prioritized for resettlement the Iraqi, Bhutanese, and Colombian
populations, expecting to receive approximately 3,900 Iraqi refugees from Syria and
Jordan, 1,300 Colombians from Colombia and Latin America, 1,000 Bhutanese
refugees from Nepal, 3,600 African refugees from the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes
region, Cairo and Pretoria, and 2,000 from the rest of the world, for a projected total
of 11,800 globally.134 In order to establish these priorities, CIC had to consider its
previous commitments, as well as its limited budget.

Necessity to consider previous multi-year commitments
Regarding GARs, in 2007, Canada had committed to resettling 5,000 Bhutanese
refugees by 2012. As the first selection team of CIC officers arrived in Nepal in
September 2008, the first Bhutanese arrivals in Canada only started occurring in
134
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2009.135 Canada had also in the past committed to resettling close to 4,000 Karen
refugees from Thailand. Just over 3,900 were already selected by Canada, and most
had already been resettled by the end of 2008. However, nearly 900 of these Karen
refugees who were scheduled to be resettled by December 2008 had not yet arrived to
Canada. These delays had been due to local floods, coups d’état, airport sit-ins, and
other such sources of instability occurring in Thailand at the time. The end of
resettlement operations for the Karen group in 2008 would have translated into the
increased availability of resettlement spaces for other groups in 2009. Instead,
however, most of these 900 Karen refugees were to be resettled in 2009, and some
even in 2010.136

In addition to Canada’s previous commitments to resettle the Bhutanese and the
Karen, Canada also committed to resettling a number of asylees in Turkey. As
explained above, resettlement from Turkey was strategic: major resettlement countries
had agreed to resettle some of its asylum seekers, in order for Turkey to keep its
borders open to more potential refugee movements. Many Iraqis referred by UNHCR
in Turkey to Canada had already been interviewed and selected by the middle of 2009,
and were due to be resettled in Canada sometime in 2010.137

Influence of CIC’s establishment of priorities on the resettlement of Iraqis
As can be noted in Table 1 below, the resettlement of Iraqis was considered to be one
of CIC’s priorities since 2004, although they only began to be resettled in greater
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numbers in 2008. Iraqis were actually the top resettlement priority for Canada in
2008, as well as in 2009.138

In 2009, Canada committed to resettling over a 3- to 4-year period a minimum of
12,000 refugees out of its embassy in Syria, with at least 2,500 persons being selected
per year under the PSR program. The vast majority of these refugees were Iraqis.
This was a considerable increase in allocated spaces to privately sponsored Iraqis
given that they will be allocated 7,500 spaces over this period, out of a total 9,900 to
13,500 spaces allocated to PSRs globally during the same period.139

For CIC to meet its commitment of 5,000 Bhutanese to be resettled by 2012, more
than 1,000 had to be resettled in 2009, 2010, and 2011. This yearly 1000 individuals,
combined with the multi-year commitment to Iraqi refugees (4,500 over three years),
thus represented a large portion of the usual yearly resettlement target of
approximately 7,500 GARs.140

Limited budget, limited capacity: prioritizing cost-effectiveness
The budget for the resettlement program, determined by Parliament, was left at the
same level since 1998. It is for this reason that the total number of GARs admitted to
Canada has hovered around 7,500 over the last few years.141 Considering the limited
budget put to its disposal, CIC’s Resettlement Division devised a pragmatic and costeffective approach. It first recognized that it is simply much more cost-effective when
both GAR and PSR caseloads are processed in one same location, rather than only
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GARs or only PSRs being processed by a single mission. The cost-effectiveness of a
potential selection mission of GARs, PSRs, or both, will thus usually be one of the
main factors determining whether this mission will be carried out. Although the
Karen refugees in Thailand and Bhutanese refugees in Nepal have only been resettled
to Canada through the GAR program,142 these groups were resettled in large numbers
by a range of resettlement countries, which also made the selection missions and
resettlement operations more cost-effective.

As described previously, an increase in resettlement numbers in one region or of one
population would therefore necessitate a decrease in resettlement numbers for another
population, in order to not exceed the maximum number of individuals that can be
admitted to Canada yearly, with the allocated resources. It was felt, however, that
these shifts of priorities had traditionally been done by the government at the cost of a
decrease in resettlement from the continent of Africa, while for the Middle East, for
example, humanitarian emergencies were often making the news headlines.143
Although GAR numbers were decreased by Canada in some regions, PSR space
allocations were eventually increased. Such a shift was also in line with the objective
for the program to be cost-effective, in that the cost of the PSR program is mostly
absorbed by the private sponsors, while that of the GAR program is covered solely by
the government.

Compared to all other types of migration, refugee processing is the most complex and
expensive. While, generally, applications for immigration to Canada are processed
without the occurrence of in-person interviews, this is not the case for refugee cases.
142
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Refugees must either travel to the nearest CIC mission abroad, or when this is not
possible, CIC officers must travel to the refugees’ locations. When the processing of
refugees must take place in camps, it may take the CIC selection team a few days to
get to the refugees’ location, and another few days to return. Such journeys on the
continent of Africa, for example, may also entail traveling through minefields. In
such cases, CIC must also invest in security staff, UN escort guides, and cover the
cost of rentals for UNHCR armored vehicles, among other expenses. Considering all
these factors, a selection team may only be sent to such a location when the refugee
caseload is large enough to make the mission more cost-effective.144

However, the in-Canada support of refugees is said to represent far more in terms of
costs, compared to the costs of overseas processing. In fact, out of the Resettlement
Assistance Program (RAP) budget, 75% will go directly to GARs in the form of
income support, while the other 25% will be transferred to the SPOs to finance
services for the resettled refugees. Despite these costs, the RAP budget is still
considered to represent the bare minimum needed.145

In addition, the Immigrant Loan Program, covering the cost of refugees’ transport to
Canada and of the medical assessment fees incurred abroad, is an amount that must be
repaid by the refugees within approximately 6 years of their arrival.146 Although such
a loan program is implemented by Canada and the U.S. in order to save on their
program cost, every other resettlement country absorbs these costs on behalf of the
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UNHCR-referred refugee. 147 In the recent past, a number of other organizations from
different sections of public services appealed to the government to eliminate the
loans’ policy, such as anti-poverty groups, children advocacy groups, and settlement
organizations working with newcomers, all linking the loans to disadvantaged youth,
and extended years of struggle and living beneath the poverty level. They argued that
this loan was of such magnitude, especially for individuals being resettled to Canada
with nearly nothing, that it often created a insurmountable burden on the refugee
individual or family, pulling them or keeping them away from any chance of being
financially self-sufficient, or being able to concentrate on language classes long
enough to reach a level necessary to access middle to upper-range job markets.148

If the resettlement program would see an increase in budget, it would thus be most
beneficial to all those resettled if the loan program were eliminated and the RAP
budget increased, rather than resettling a greater number of individuals that would
receive minimal support upon arrival.149

Cost-effectiveness in the case of Iraqi resettlement
Being resettled to Canada through both the GAR and the PSR programs, Iraqi
refugees are therefore a good example of an effective use of resources. The
processing of Iraqis is also perhaps slightly cheaper compared to other groups,
considering the fact that most, if not all Iraqis in Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon,
are urban refugees living in the asylum countries’ capitals.
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Prioritizing border control and security
Numerous sources felt that it is not the lack of overall resources of the Government of
Canada that is the problem, but rather, its establishment of priorities. The current and
previous governments have long claimed having limited resources to dedicate to the
refugee resettlement and asylum systems, while they have continually allocated
considerably sized budgets and resources to other initiatives such as interdiction,
imposition of visas, or other types of measures that result in denying individuals in
need of protection the ability to reach Canada and make an asylum claim.150

Box 1: Migration Integrity Officer Program
For Canada, interdiction refers to the practice of denying individuals in possession of
improper documentation access to the country. Migration Integrity Officers (MIO)
are employees of the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), who are placed “in
46 key foreign embarkation, transit, and immigration points around the world.”151
Global MIO staff counts 56 individuals. They are involved in the interdiction of
approximately 5,000 individuals per year, and in the facilitated entry to Canada of
3,000 individuals yearly, most of the latter being Canadian citizens returning to the
Canada.152 The Migration Integrity Officer program was developed in the context of
Canada’s Multiple Borders Strategy, described as a strategy “focusing its intelligence
and interdiction efforts on each of these [overseas] checkpoints in order to keep
inadmissible and potentially harmful individuals as far away from North America as
possible. […] Passenger analysis units [are] established at Canadian airports to
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identify high-risk travellers before they arrive, thus enabling CIC to identify criminals
and security threats earlier in the travel continuum.”153

Some believed that the Refugees Branch of CIC is not getting the portion of the larger
budget that it should, i.e. portions that are being dedicated in favor of other priorities,
rather than to the selection of individuals in need of protection.154

Influence of security concerns on Iraqi resettlement to Canada
In the case of Iraqis specifically, the government as well as the media were concerned
with potential security issues tied to this group, and implemented more thorough
security measures within resettlement program for Iraqis as a result. Some Iraqis in
Canada considered these increases in security measures related to resettlement as
completely legitimate, considering the complexities in detecting individuals with more
ill intentions and less legitimate protection needs.155

Influence of Canada’s humanitarian tradition on resettlement
Canada’s refugee resettlement program is also driven by its long history of receiving
refugees from the time of the Second World War, to the intake of tens of thousands of
Vietnamese Boat people, and of many other groups thereafter. Canada, the United
States, and Australia have long histories of sponsorship-like programs, past and/or
current, that are similar to the current PSR program.
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Others felt that due to its geography, Canada had always had the capacity to be
selective, unlike other countries surrounded by refugee-producing countries. In the
midst of growing discourse that divides refugees resettled from overseas from asylum
seekers who select Canada as their country of asylum, some argued that Canada
exercised its capacity to be selective at the cost of denying asylum seekers their right
to protection from persecution.156,157

Canada’s tradition of resettling Iraqis
Canada also has a long history of taking Iraqi refugees since the beginning of Saddam
Hussein’s regime, much before the 1991, 1998, and 2003 wars, and subsequent
refugee outflows.158 This tradition may have worked in favor of Iraqi resettlement,
due to Canada’s familiarity with this population, as much as it could have worked
against this group, due to the host community’s perception that Iraqis may be less in
need of support than other groups that may appear to be more vulnerable.

Use of the Source Country Class program only when feasible
The Source Country Class program consists of processing individuals in refugee-like
situations who may be internally displaced and experiencing persecution based on one
of the five grounds defining a Convention Refugee, with no other durable solution
available to them within a reasonable period of time.159

Although six countries appear on Canada’s Source Country Class list (Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, El Salvador, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, and
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Colombia160), processing under this program is currently only possible in Colombia.
This is due to the fact that the Colombian government has been highly cooperative
with Canada in order to facilitate the resettlement of a portion of its population, unlike
the five other countries listed.161 When deciding whether to initiate in-country
processing, CIC must thus consider whether it would be safe – or even possible – for
CIC officers to be able to regularly access the processing location without
endangering themselves, or the refugee applicants they are aiming to assist.162

Possible application of Source Country class program in Iraq
Iraq does not figure on Canada’s list of possible locations for Source Country Class
processing both due to the fact that the Canadian government does not have any
official presence or diplomatic mission in Baghdad, and to the fact that Iraq is not
considered by Canada to be a sufficiently safe country for visa officers to routinely
travel to or for applicants to travel to a given processing location.163 Only Iraqi
citizens who are in Iraq and who wish to have an immigration case processed while
they are still residing in Iraq can file an application with the Canadian Embassy in
Damascus, and travel to this location for interviews, medical assessments, and other
related formalities.164

Considering the security situation in Iraq that is not expected to greatly improve in
near future, it is unlikely that Iraqis still in the country could be considered under this
category.
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‘Likeliness to successfully establish’ criterion
One of the criteria to be considered in the Canadian resettlement selection process is
an applicant’s potential to successfully establish himself or herself in Canada. More
specifically,
applicants must show potential to become self-sufficient and successfully establish in
Canada within a 3 to 5 year time frame. Factors such as education, presence of a support
network (family or sponsor) in Canada, work experience and qualifications, ability to
learn to speak English or French and other personal suitability factors such as
resourcefulness will be taken into account by visa officers. However, this criteria does
not apply to refugees determined by a visa officer who fall within the categories: ‘urgent
need of protection’ or ‘vulnerable’.165
Both refugees admitted under the [Urgent Protection Program (UPP)] and those
determined by a visa officer as vulnerable are not required to demonstrate an ability to
successfully establish in Canada.166

Although this criterion exists, it is said to be applied so softly that it would be very
difficult (though not impossible) to deny a case on this basis alone.

INFLUENCE OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE SELECTION PROCESS ON IRAQI RESETTLEMENT
For Iraqis in particular, this criterion would have never or rarely come into
consideration during the process of selection, likely due to Iraqis’ generally strong
educational and professional backgrounds, and thus to their high likeliness of
successfully establishing in Canada.167 In cases where high needs individuals could
not demonstrate their potential ability to quickly successfully establish, however,
Canada’s resettlement selection guidelines calls for the application of a ‘sliding scale’,
where higher protection needs would require less of a need to demonstrate the
successful establishment criterion.168
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Although this criterion did not seem to be applied in the case of the Iraqi caseload,
there was a concern with the fact that is was ever applied at all. It had been observed
that an informal scale is still being used by CIC to assess applicants’ potential ability
to successfully establish despite the fact that the application of such a criterion does
not agree with the principals of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.169 Although
UNHCR has asked for Canada to completely remove the criterion, Canada has only
done so on an official level.170

Absence of a resettlement program for urgent medical cases
Since the implementation of the 2002 IRPA, although individuals presenting severe
medical conditions can still be denied resettlement to Canada if they potentially
present a threat to the Canadian population (either a medical threat, or a physical
threat in the case of a mental health issue that could make an individual susceptible to
harming others), refugees can no longer be found inadmissible if they necessitate
excessive medical care, and/or if this medical care can potentially represent excessive
costs.171 However, Canads’s system does not allow for the resettlement of urgent
medical cases.

The spirit of the Canadian resettlement program would indicate that Canada would
ideally prioritize high needs medical cases. However, Canada’s main challenge in
implementing a resettlement program that would allow for the admission and
settlement of urgent medical cases to Canada is the fact that refugee resettlement is a
federal jurisdiction, while Canadian health care is of provincial jurisdiction. To make
169
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such a program possible, the federal and provincial governments would have to create
a coordinated program, which would allow UNHCR to refer high-needs medical cases
to Canada in a swift manner, and allow for the appropriate care would be dispensed
upon the refugee’s arrival. However, due to this governmental structure, it is hard to
imagine that such an effective program would ever be possible to implement in
Canada.172

The Joint Assistance Sponsorship (JAS) program is said to be an effective option to
resettle high-needs cases – medical or other – if other avenues are not available.173
The JAS program is a combination of the GAR and PSR programs, where individuals
receive government assistance (RAP) during two or three years, depending on the
extent of the needs, but also have a SPO mandated to provide supplemental guidance
and moral support to this individual.174 However, Canada is said not to have adequate
resources available to deal with highly traumatized persons. SPOs in Quebec were
reported to being left to themselves to deal with such cases, with little information
being made available prior to the resettlement of these high-needs individual, and
inadequate networks and resources to provide these individuals the services they
require. Although the jurisdiction of such services is provincial and that the level of
support offered to other JAS cases in the rest of the country is likely to vary,175 the
problem seems to be omnipresent across the country.176

Influence of the absence of an effective resettlement program for high needs cases on
Iraqi resettlement
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The Iraqi population has a very high and increasing incidence of severe health
conditions. In fact, it was reported that Iraqis suffered of cancer and other severe
sickness at uncommonly high levels.177 Although the new provisions included in
Canadian law since the 2002 IRPA at least exempt some cases from being denied
resettlement to the potential high cost of their medical care once in Canada, or to the
nature of their condition, Iraqis who have conditions that may require urgent medical
attention will simply not be referred by UNHCR to Canada, due to the absence of a
system to receive and adequately treat these individuals illnesses.

International conventions and 2002 IRPA
The 2002 IRPA defines the rights that both GARs and PSRs are now entitled to. The
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, incorporated into the 2002 IRPA, will not only
affect Canada’s actions relating to its own resettlement and asylum systems, but it will
also affect its choice of responsibility-sharing duties. For example, if a country is
signatory to the Convention, Canada will not normally accept a refugee referral from
this country, as it will expect this country to exercise its own responsibility-sharing
duties by granting asylum to the individual. However, Canada will accept referrals
from Kenya, Thailand, and South Africa, among a few others. In the case of South
Africa, although this country has signed the Convention, Canada has accepted to
resettle some of its asylum seekers. This is due to the fact that South Africa is still in
the process of building its own refugee determination system, for which Canada
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provided technical expertise and support. To assist with South Africa’s backlog,
Canada accepted to assist in this country’s efforts to meet its humanitarian goals.178

However, it was felt that Canada was failing on many levels to meet its legal
obligations in relation to the protection of refugee populations, notably in terms of
statelessness. While Canada has signed the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness, it has not yet signed the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons, which is considered to be the most significant one. As the latter
Convention had not been signed, and therefore not incorporated into Canadian laws, it
does not provide stakeholders the appropriate tools to protect the rights of stateless
persons and to find a remedy to their situation.179 Canada is said to have had many
opportunities to ratify the 1954 Convention. However, the fact that Canada has not
yet acted on the issue was seen as a sign that the goodwill and good intentions of
Canada were simply absent regarding the needs of stateless persons.180 In sum, it was
felt that Canada will almost always seem like it is meeting all its obligations, however,
it often does not, especially when it feels that it is meeting its most basic and pressing
obligations. It is also feared that UNHCR is too accepting of the image that Canada is
projecting – one of a true humanitarian country with excellent programs, in land and
overseas. When it comes to having the opportunity to truly commit to measures that
may effectively protect all refugees, it is felt that Canada fails, with regards in
particular to stateless persons,181 high needs medical cases, women at risk, or even
persons referred under its own PSR program who are not admitted, despite seemingly
appearing to meet all the criteria necessary to be granted resettlement.
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The case of Iraqi Palestinians
It is felt that the ratification of the 1954 Convention would give Canada and other
stakeholders more tools to attempt to find durable solutions for stateless persons such
as the Palestinians. In the meanwhile, however, the PSR program is considered to be
of particular value due to the fact that it could be used to resettle Palestinian
refugees.182 Although it was understood from the perspective of some of the
interviewees that Canada could have resettled under the GAR program Palestinians
who formerly resided in Iraq, it was felt that Canada decided to resettle them only
under the PSR program (through the process of Visa Office Referrals – VORs) in
order to avoid a possible backlash from Canadian-based groups that may be known
not to favor the interests of Palestinians. It was felt that the Canadian government
could more easily resettle this group under the PSR program, instead of through the
GAR program, where individuals would have been entirely taken charge by the state.
In 2009, Canada thus began to resettle under the PSR program Palestinian refugees
who had fled Iraq in 2006, and had since been residing for the most part in Al Hol
Camp, Syria, and a few in the nearing camp of Al Tanf, Many more Palestinians
remain, however, in these camps and in many others across the Middle East.
Although without the incorporation into Canadian law of more provisions that would
support the rights of stateless persons, there is little hope to find a solution to their
endless state of asylum,

Influence domestic law and federal-provincial sharing of responsibility
According to Canadian legislation, the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and
Multiculturalism must declare to Parliament on November 1st of every year how many
182
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individuals, by category, will be admitted to Canada within the following year. This
is referred to as the ‘levels plan’.183 As immigration is one of the only two issues
under the Constitution Act for which federal and provincial governments have formal
shared jurisdiction,184 every year, high-level discussions regarding immigration occur
at the Ministerial level, at the Deputy Minister level, with each province, and then as a
collective. Provincial governments thus have a highly influential voice with regards
to how many individuals of each immigrant category will be admitted to their
territory. Once provinces determine how many immigrants they are in a position to
take, the number of refugees they will receive will be a specific proportion of their
immigrant intake.185

Influences of the International Community on Iraqi Resettlement
In 2009, the international community considered that Iraqis constituted one of the
groups in most urgent need to be resettled and to merit international concern.186 In the
context of the policy-making process relating to resettlement, Canada will routinely
look to other countries of resettlement, exchange on how the resettlement community
as a whole can participate in collective efforts to alleviate particular refugee situations.
CIC is also in daily communication with its missions abroad, in order to have a more
accurate picture of how potential or ongoing refugee situations are developing.187 In
the situation of the Iraqis, the delay in initiating resettlement operations for this group
indicates that Canada was notably looking to other resettlement countries to define its
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own course of action. Although the missions in the region of the Middle East must
have been aware of the situation on the ground and an apparent need for action, other
factors and influences evidently superseded.

INFLUENCE OF UNHCR ON CANADA’S RESETTLEMENT POLICIES AND OPERATIONS
Canada works very closely with the main implementer of the Convention and Protocol
relating to status of refugees, UNHCR. UNHCR’s mandate is notably to identify
those most in need of protection through resettlement. CIC is invited to Geneva thrice
yearly to attend UNHCR meetings along with other resettlement countries, and to
meet with UNHCR bilaterally as well. In the context of these meetings, Canada will
participate in finding effective strategies to alleviate the impacts of refugee
movements on all those concerned. UNHCR’s proposals for action have a
considerable influence on the policy-making process related to the Canada’s refugee
program, and on the strategies adopted by Canada to share the international burden of
refugee crises. Canada is known to follow UNHCR’s lead, and to seek guidance from
UNHCR on which groups are in need of resettlement worldwide.188,189

UNHCR’s appeals and statements of priorities in relation to Iraqis
Prior to 14 February 2007, UNHCR’s protection strategy for Iraqis did not involve
promoting resettlement, though it did not oppose resettlement or any migration
solution for individuals if they were able to find such a solution on their own. They
appealed to the governments of the main countries of asylum in the Middle East to
respect the principle of non-refoulement, thus to allow them access to their territory,
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and not to return refugees to their country of origin under any circumstance.190
UNHCR advised Canada and other potential resettlement countries to keep the Iraqi
population in the region at the time. Thus, by not implementing resettlement prior to
2007, Canada was simply following UNHCR’s directive to this effect.191

An announcement was then made by UNHCR and the U.S. Department of State on 14
February 2007.192 In this statement, where the United States announced its
commitments to alleviate the Iraqi refugee crisis, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees António Guterres emphasized the main issues at stake: the plight of the
estimated 1.8 million internally displaced people within Iraq, and that of the estimated
2 million Iraqi refugees residing mainly in Jordan and Syria. Mr. Guterres reiterated
that resettlement could not be the solution for all Iraqis, especially considering the
limited number of resettlement spaces that were available globally. The priority was
therefore to make sure that the current needs of the refugee population were met in
their countries of asylum. Mr. Guterres urged the international community to provide
support to Jordan and Syria, whose economies and infrastructures had taken a
considerable toll due to the mass influx of Iraqis since 2003. Another major concern
was the impending risk of the general population of these countries to turn against
Iraqis, thus putting the security of this refugee population, of the entire region, at a
high risk. UNHCR also appealed to the international community to resettle some
20,000 Iraqis globally. 193
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Some Iraqi PSR applications that had been previously denied by Canada were later
approved when resubmitted after UNHCR’s appeal. However, in principle, the PSR
program should not be influenced by any of UNHCR’s assessments of global
resettlement needs. Rather, Canadian visa officers are to make individual refugee
status determinations, regardless of the existence of other types of resettlement
programs for a given refugee group. To approve a PSR case, CIC needs only to look
at whether an applicant’s persecution story is based on one of the five grounds
outlined in the 1951 Convention, and whether the applicant is eligible and admissible.
Although no official directive was necessarily given by Canadian authorities to deny
these cases before the time of UNHCR’s resettlement appeal, no directive was known
to have been given to apply inadmissibility criteria less strictly.194

UNHCR’s assessment of resettlement as a durable solution
At the time of its appearance before the Standing Committee on Citizenship and
Immigration, UNHCR informed the Committee about a survey commissioned by
UNHCR in Syria, which showed that only 4% of the surveyed Iraqis in asylum in
Syria had plans to return to Iraq. Out of these, only 31% were planning to return to
Iraq within one year following the survey, while the others did not have a date in
mind.195 UNHCR was attempting to demonstrate that the problems facing Syria and
the Iraqi population they were hosting were not about to disappear, and could very
well worsen with the increasingly strained state of the Syrian infrastructure, and
possibly of additional refugee flows into the country.
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Although there was a considerable amount of lobbying done in 2003 and 2004 in
favor of resettlement of Iraqis to Canada, this was said not to be enough to drive the
Canadian government to resettle large numbers of Iraqis at the time.196 The fact that
Canada did not elect to resettle a greater number of Iraqis before 2007-2008 was
simply because UNHCR was not referring Iraqi refugees prior to this period. In the
context of all large-scale refugee movements, UNHCR’s immediate concerns are
always to cater to the population’s most basic needs: provide physical protection
through their Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process and the distribution of
legal documents, set up health services and food distribution systems, set up and
maintain refugee camps, etc. UNHCR’s strategy is that resettlement operations
should only begin a few years after onset of a refugee crisis, when it can be better
assessed whether the situation in the country of origin will not be improving within a
reasonable period of time, i.e. within 5 or 6 years. However, resettlement may be
implemented earlier in situations where extra asylum space could be created in a
country of first asylum, to allow for more individuals to seek temporary refugee, or in
contexts where the asylum countries are experiencing unsustainable pressures on their
infrastructure or other.197

In August 2007, in view of the deteriorating security situation in South and Central
Iraq, UNHCR issued new guidelines stipulating that Iraqis from these regions should
be considered as prima facie refugees.198 The issuance of these guidelines
strengthened UNHCR’s appeal made earlier that year, which called for the
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international community to prioritize the resettlement of Iraqis, especially those from
the regions identified by UNHCR as least stable and secure.

Initiating mass resettlement operations for Iraqis
In 2007, UNHCR appealed to other countries planning to begin resettlement
operations for Iraqis to increase their commitments. UNHCR’s appeal was felt to be
of most urgent nature, due to the fact that at the time, the estimated number of Iraqi
individuals who were expected by UNHCR to be in need of resettlement was
considerably larger than the number of spaces the resettlement community had yet
committed to globally.199

During this same period, a Canadian delegation traveled to Jordan, Syria and Turkey
to meet with representatives from the U.S., Australia, and UNHCR to explore the
ways in which Canada could help alleviate the Iraqi refugee crisis, and how the
resettlement community as a whole could offer an effective remedy to situation. The
delegations also came together to assess the number of individuals who would be in
need of resettlement, and how resettlement numbers could be divided amongst
partnering resettlement countries.200

The represented countries aimed to ensure that their actions would not be perceived in
an ill manner by the countries of asylum, and that these actions would not risk further
destabilizing the region in any way. As such, it was felt that the resettlement
operations needed not only to be of large scale, but also needed to be as equitable as
possible, with resettlement targets spread across the region in a proportionate fashion.
199
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Canada evaluated that as Syria was hosting the largest number of Iraqis, Canada
should resettle the largest number of Iraqis from Syria; this was to be followed by
Jordan, and then others. Canada’s second and third priorities were to resettle
individuals referred by UNHCR based on one the 11 vulnerability criteria, and finally,
those whose cases would be submitted to CIC by private sponsors.201 The 11
vulnerable categories identified by UNHCR specifically for the Iraqi caseload were:202
1. Survivors of violence and torture
2. Members of minority groups who are/have been targeting in their country
of origin due to their religious or ethnic background203
3. Women-at-Risk
4. Unaccompanied minors
5. Family reunification (i.e., dependants of refugees living in resettlement
countries)
6. Elderly Persons-at-Risk
7. Persons with medical needs with no effective treatment available in the
country of asylum
8. High profile cases and/or their family members
9. Iraqis who fled as a result of their association in their country of origin
with the Multi-National Forces, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the
United Nations, foreign countries, international and foreign institutions or
companies and members of the press
10. Stateless persons from Iraq
11. Iraqis at immediate risk of refoulement
The majority of the Iraqi cases referred to Canada have been referred under the
categories of Legal and Physical Protection Needs, Survivors of Violence and Torture,
and Women-at-Risk.204 (See Table 3)
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Table 3: UNHCR Submissions and Departure of Iraqi Refugees to Canada by
Criteria, 2007-2008*
UNHCR submissions and departure of Iraqi refugees to Canada by criteria,
2007 – 2008
2007
2008
Criteria
Sub Dep Sub
Dep
Women-at-Risk
290
32
397
93
Children and adolescents
1
Family Reunification
9
1
Legal and Physical Protection Needs
567
72
743
201
Medical needs
42
6
40
7
Older (elderly) refugees
8
3
27
2
Refugees without Local Integration Prospects
46
19
175
583
Survivor of Violence and Torture
553
34 1,328
144
Grand Total
1,515 166 2,712 1,030
*Provided by M. Casasola, UNHCR, in an email communication to the author, July 2009

UNHCR appeals, and the international communities’ response
In 2007, UNHCR made three appeals to the international community: one at the level
of US$ 123 million to be invested towards humanitarian assistance in Syria, another
of US$ 129 million to support Syria’s education sector, and finally one of
approximately US$ 85 million to address the urgent health needs of Iraqis in Syria,
Jordan, and Egypt. In the same year, Canada committed US$ 2.5 million towards
UNHCR’s first appeal. In 2008, UNHCR appealed for an additional US$ 261 million
to be invested in assisting Iraqi refugees and displaced persons. In response, Canada
committed 1.5 million to this appeal.205

UNHCR stated in the first part of 2008 that while the resettlement operations were
well underway on the side of UNHCR, and that the organization had succeeded in
significantly increasing its referral capacity in Syria and Jordan, the main concern had
become the low rate of departures of Iraqis from their countries of asylum to their new
countries of resettlement. UNHCR thus urged the major resettlement countries,
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including Canada to try to expedite the processes of selection and departures. They
also reiterated that between 80,000 and 90,000 Iraqi refugees in the Middle East were
still considered by UNHCR to be vulnerable and in need of resettlement, and that as
such, a far greater number of resettlement spaces were urgently required to meet these
needs. UNHCR also expressed concern at the time about the fact that only half of the
value of the financial pledges made by international community had been received by
UNHCR by early 2008, and that the received amounts did not represent enough to
keep UNHCR’s programs for Iraqis operating during the second half of 2008.
UNHCR thus called for increased and sustained financial contributions. They also
appealed to the international community for more bilateral support to Syria and
Jordan, in order to alleviate the pressures on their strained economies and
infrastructure.206

Despite all of UNHCR’s appeals, and the agency’s hopes that the international
community would respond positively, it is a state’s voluntary act engage in
resettlement, as there is no existing right to request resettlement from a particular
country. UNHCR’s funding structure as set out by the General Assembly and its
Executive Committee makes UNHCR reliant upon voluntary contributions of states,
while only receiving a small amount of funding directly from the UN.207 Therefore,
UNHCR could not grade Canada’s response to its appeals, but rather, it could express
gratitude for what Canada had done and continued to do. UNHCR could thus also
only respectfully request that these actions continue, or that contributions be
increased.
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FACTORS LEADING TO DELAYS IN RESETTLEMENT OPERATIONS
UNHCR operations
Although Canada committed to resettling several hundred Iraqis during the first year
of these resettlement operations (approximately 400 or 500 GARs in 2007), these
targets were not met. The low resettlement numbers of Iraqis in 2007 was due to the
fact that at this time, UNHCR was not yet running at its full capacity, in order to be
able to deliver the large numbers of refugee referrals requested by all resettlement
countries combined in time for them to meet their specific calendar or fiscal year
targets.

However, the Iraqi resettlement operations did represent the largest resettlement
exercise in approximately 2 decades.208 In 2003, UNHCR was only referring for
resettlement a total of 35,314 refugees globally.209 In contrast, when the resettlement
operations for Iraqis began, 12,000 referrals had to be prepared by UNHCR for the
United States alone. It thus seemed reasonable that UNHCR took some time to gear
up all of their missions in the Middle East, that some time was needed for a sufficient
number of Iraqis to register with UNHCR, and that also much time was required for
UNHCR to make sure that all referrals met the respective requirements of every
resettlement country. Regarding the latter, specific requirements included different
types of medical examination procedures, different exclusions, different security
check procedures, and so on. Therefore, once UNHCR’s missions were running at
full capacity, their output was said to be ‘phenomenal’. Consequently, in 2008, when
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the UNHCR referrals were flowing in, and the pressure on the United States continued
to increase, Canada pledged to further increase its commitments.210

CIC operations
As mentioned above, the Canadian government had declared opening up PSR spaces
for Iraqis in the hopes that private sponsorship organizations would have the capacity
to meet this target. However, the issue of resettlement capacity in the context of the
PSR program was not one related to the capacity of the potential refugee sponsors.
Rather, it was directly related to the limited capacity of the CIC office in Toronto to
process the high number Iraqi PSR applications in this area – the area with the largest
portion of private sponsors of Iraqi refugees – and to CIC’s slow reaction in finding a
remedy to this issue of understaffing.211 Canadian government workers thus had
considerable influence in the fact that this issue was not addressed in a timely fashion,
thus slowing down the entire PSR process for Iraqi PSR cases submitted in Toronto in
particular. Although this instance may not necessarily demonstrate a bias of any kind,
it simply shows how particular administrative procedures can have far reaching
consequences for some individuals, such as those whose cases were delayed for many
months due to this one issue.

IRAQIS’ RELIGIOUS BACKGROUNDS
The author was not able to obtain statistics on the religious profile of those resettled to
Canada. An applicant’s religious affiliation, or the ground(s) upon which a person
was persecuted and found to be a refugee, are in fact not captured in CIC’s database,
as such tracking would violate principles stipulated under the Canadian Charter of
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Human Rights. Rather, the religious affiliation of an applicant would only be found in
immigration officer’s notes in the applicant’s physical case file. The only information
captured in the database will be whether or not the individual was persecuted based
one of the five grounds defining a Convention Refugee, whether the individual is
referred as a Woman-at-Risk case, an individual in need of urgent protection,
unaccompanied minors, and cases selected under the One-Year-Window program.212

Perception regarding the favoring of Iraqi Christians
The PSR program was observed to be essentially a Christian movement. This was not
to say that sponsors in Canada did not sponsor applicants of other religions, however,
in the case of Iraqis, it was observed by the visa officers on the ground that Privately
Sponsored Iraqis were almost 100% Christian.213

Similarly, regarding UNHCR-referred cases, Christians Iraqis had long been overrepresented in the registered refugee population in Jordan and Syria, and that
consequently, more Christians seemed to have been referred for resettlement
worldwide.214 In fact, while Iraqi Christians represented less than 3% of the total Iraqi
population,215 they represented approximately 14% of all Iraqi refugee registrations
with UNHCR,216 and a large portion of all cases referred for resettlement. To
counteract this observed phenomena seemingly in favor or Iraqi Christians, UNHCR
carried out mobile registration campaigns, notably in Syria. Iraqi asylum seekers
212
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would be approached in order for UNHCR to evaluate the needs of the population and
better inform the delivery of direct services to the population, as well as to promote
UNHCR registration for their own protection and for possible access to
resettlement.217 UNHCR’s efforts in the resettlement operations for Iraqis thus
seemed balanced and non-discriminatory in terms of the applicants’ religious
backgrounds. UNHCR’s main objective was really only to meet their targets for Iraqi
resettlement referrals, which were higher than they had been in decades of global
resettlement activities. These targets were only hoped to be met by UNHCR,
regardless of the religious profile of all of their referred applicants.218,219,220

With regards to the PSR program, however, Christians may have also been resettled in
greater proportion, simply because of the fact that the Iraqi population in Canada was
predominantly Christian and that, like any other group, Christian Iraqis naturally
tended to sponsor their own families, friends, or members of their own religious
communities.221

In addition, there had also been a considerable amount of pressure on the government
from certain sections of the Iraqi community in Canada, but most especially from
Iraqi Christians. One problematic issue was that some of the Christian Iraqis in
Canada genuinely feel that they represented the real Iraqi refugees, or the largest
portion of the Iraqi refugee population.222 However, in reality, although they
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constituted a considerable proportion of the referred cases, the clear majority of the
entire Iraqi refugee population was of Muslim background.223

It was also felt that the current Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and
Multiculturalism, Mr. Jason Kenney, had his own bias in favor of the Iraqi Christians.
He was reported to have visited a number of Iraqi Christian organizations during this
period, which fueled this perception. All Iraqis – no matter their religious
backgrounds – had to do military service, and many individuals of all religious
backgrounds were career military personnel. It was thus a stark misperception that
Iraqi Christians would not have any of the military triggers that would make them
inadmissible for refugee resettlement, although this was a nuance felt to be either not
understood or not clearly expressed by the Minister.224

This bias was also interpreted through the fact that the Iraqi-Palestinians were only
resettled under the PSR program, rather under the auspices of the public GAR
program. The arguments offered by the government to explain why these refugees
were not considered under the GAR program were thought not to hold, and suggested
that the government could in fact have resettled these refugees under the GAR
program, if it had the political will to do so.225 Some concluded that resettlement of
the Palestinian refugees under the PSR program was thus another indication of a
noticeable bias on the part of the government in favor of the Christians, and in
disfavor of all others.226
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INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL POLITICS
Influence of Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism and
Parliament officials
The current Minister of Immigration and Citizenship and the country’s Prime Minister
were also felt not to be open to suggestions aiming to further assist refugee
populations in general, such as increasing the yearly resettlement quota, rather than
shifting resettlement numbers from region to region and maintaining a resettlement
cap. It was felt that the government’s actions or non-actions seemed to be mainly
driven by politics, and that as such, many actors in the field had become particularly
disheartened by the views and attitudes expressed by top political figures, as well as
by their objective of drastically restructuring of Canada’s asylum system.227

In 2008, the Secretary General of AIC spoke before the Standing Committee for
Citizenship and Immigration and joined the CCR in its appeals to the government to
prioritize and increase the resettlement of Iraqi refugees. More specifically, he
appealed to Canada to increase resettlement numbers for the Iraqi refugee populations
in Syria and Jordan, and urged the government to urgently consider resettling the
Palestinian refugees residing in Syria.228 It was felt, however, that AIC’s lobbying
and advocacy regarding Iraqi resettlement had not been very effective on the political
sphere, and that with the current conservative government in place, most particularly
the current CIC Minister, not many of these issues were likely to move in the direction
that AIC would have hoped.

Policy-making decisions relating to refugee resettlement in Canada are officially
based on Canada’s humanitarian objectives, refugee populations’ protection needs and
227
228

Ibid., 0:00m.
Wu, G. Ibid., 0:00m; 0:17m; 0:26m.
84

Canada’s available capacity, i.e. where can refugees be accessed safely, effectively,
and efficiently. However, these decisions are also clearly influenced by the political
level of government, based on the elected officials’ consultations with their
constituents. To increase the resettlement budget, and thus to obtain funding from the
central budget is a complex process which requires a policy shift, and choice that goes
beyond a discussion in the House of Commons.229 This is where the influence of civil
servants and elected officials could have some weight in the process of determination
of a general direction for the resettlement program as a whole.

Influence of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration
One of the platforms on which stakeholders and political actors may pronounce
themselves on this topic is in the context of the Standing Committee on Citizenship
and Immigration.

Box 2: The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration
With the creation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration following the Act
of the same name in 1994, the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration as
it is known today was established.230 The mandate of this Committee is to:
[examine] orders of references that the House of Commons refers to it. Orders of reference may relate
to bills, Estimates or order-in-council appointments. The committee may also study issues of its own
choosing. In addition, the Committee studies and reports on all matters relating to the mandate,
management and operations of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the Immigration and
Refugee Board (IRB).231
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Members of the Committee are drawn from most (or all) parties represented in the
House of Commons. Those present in the context of the meetings on Iraqi refugees
included 4 Members from the Conservative Party (including one of these members
acting as the Chairman of the Committee), 4 Members and 1 Acting Member from the
Liberal Party, 2 Members from the Bloc Québecois, 1 Member from the New
Democratic Party, and 1 Associate Member from the Green Party.232,233,234

The composition of the Standing Committee thus seemed balanced in terms of party
representation, other than the Chair being a member of the ruling party.

Influence of the Standing Committee hearings on Iraqi resettlement
One of the suspected reasons for the increase of the target for Iraqi resettlement in the
CIC mission in Syria, is the outcome of the Committees meeting on the issue of Iraqi
refugees.235 Although individuals or groups may express interest in attending,
members of the Standing Committee will decide whom will be invited to speak before
them. Representatives of AIC, IFR, and ICC were all invited to attend to speak on the
issue of the Iraqi refugee crisis over the course of meetings that took place from
December 2007 to the middle of 2008. It was understood that the Standing
Committee, at the end of their consultations, formed recommendations that would be
passed on to the CIC Minister. However, it was unclear what level of weight these
Committee recommendations had on the Minister’s decisions relating to budget
allocations or programmatic considerations with regards to the resettlement of Iraqis.
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Influence of civil servants on Iraqi resettlement
Although the Minister has shown to be attentive to Iraqi Christians in particular, the
civil servants working for CIC have demonstrated a more balanced perspective.
Another sign that the civil servants within CIC were being driven by humanitarian
concerns and true concerns for the protection of refugees was notably the facilitation
of the resettlement of Palestinians-Iraqis from Syria. Although this movement only
took place under the auspices of the PSR program, it at least showed a willingness to
push for the resettlement of the most vulnerable.236 It was thus felt that government
workers were doing their best to make optimal use of the resettlement program in the
interest of Iraqi refugees, within a certain frame of limitations.237

Moreover, although Canadian decision-makers are strongly influenced by public
pressure, the opinions of civil servants will also hold much weight in the decisionmaking process. From their perspective, Canada needs to implement a program that
meets the needs of the refugees who have been persecuted, regardless of their
religious background or other elements of their profile, and that Canada should use
UNHCR’s referral mechanism as the impartial system it is meant to be. The program
thus needs to be proportional and reflective of the vulnerable cases referred by
UNHCR.238

INLFUENCE OF PRIVATE SPONSORSHIP GROUPS
To better inform their refugee resettlement policies, CIC consults with various
stakeholders in Canada, such as the CCR, private sponsors, and others. Private
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sponsors were traditionally consulted by CIC to find out where they expected to
sponsor refugees in the year to follow. However, in 2009, CIC decided for the first
time to consult private sponsors to find out where they believed public resources
should be spent: regarding the perspective of the larger refugee and immigrant
communities in Canada; their own assessment of refugee situations worldwide; their
direct or indirect contact with refugee populations; and these individuals’ assessment
of the whether a given refugee situation could be alleviated through resettlement.239

Private Sponsors’ influence on Iraqi resettlement
Despite the fact that there was not a considerable amount of lobbying on the part of
Private Sponsorship groups, compared to others, Minister Kenney committed to
making 2,500 PSR spaces available for Iraqis in 2009. Considering that the total
number of PSR spaces allocated by Canada worldwide was 4,500 for the same year,
and that refugees from 39 different nationalities were resettled through the PSR
program in 2007, spaces allocated to Iraqis represented a proportion of more than 50%
of the program capacity, which represented a significant commitment on the part of
the government.240

However, it is felt that this prioritization of the PSR program over the GAR program
caused a shift in focus for the resettlement program that veered away from prioritizing
the assistance of the most vulnerable members of the Iraqi refugee population.
Although all resettled refugees must meet the refugee definition, private sponsorship
organizations will sponsor whomever they wish, i.e., not necessarily the most
vulnerable, or the most in need of resettlement. Rather, GARs are most likely to be
239
240

Pressé, D. Ibid., Part A, 0:13-0:14m.
Ibid., 0:28m.
88

the most vulnerable, as they will have already been screened by UNHCR and referred
for resettlement for this reasons of either high vulnerability, or in the case of the
absence of other durable solutions.241 It was also observed that the idea that refugees
should demonstrate a potential ability to successfully establish themselves in Canada
is also common within the sponsorship community, who will naturally tend to bring to
Canada individuals with whom they have ties with, and that they would be easily able
to assist in their settlement process once they arrived.242

INFLUENCE OF THE PUBLIC ON THE RESETTLEMENT OF IRAQIS
While the Canadian public certainly had the situation of Afghanistan at the forefront
of their minds considering the presence of Canadian troops on Afghan soil, this was
slightly different in the situation of Iraq, where Canada did not participate in the war,
or in the peacekeeping efforts. In comparison to the United States, however, Canada
seems to have the strongest public support regarding its refugee policies, while for the
United States, the strongest supporters of the resettlement program are considered to
be at the political level. In order to maintain this public support, it is believed that
Canada should continue to focus on resettling the most vulnerable refugees. Although
Canada should certainly not stop resettling those who seem to be in less dire need of
assistance, it was simply observed the Iraqi refugee population had been considered
have different set of needs in comparison to other groups currently or previously
resettled by Canada, such as the Bhutanese, the Karen, or the Hmong. Some SPOs
have found it challenging to meet the expectations of Iraqis due to Iraqis having had a
higher standard of living prior to the war.243 Thus, although Canada should of course
continue to resettle all those in need of this type of protection, it should also make sure
241
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to continue resettling those with greatest settlement needs, simply in order to retain
public support for the overall program.

Although it was felt that the one of the reasons for the increase in Iraqi resettlement
targets since 2007 was the increase of public pressure,244 refugee resettlement was
also found to be a hard sell to the public in the contemporary context. One reason
identified was that there were no clear and immediate benefits to receiving refugee
populations. One can compared today’s context to the 1950s, when Canada took
approximately 40,000 Hungarians in the after the Second World War, and to the 70s,
when large numbers of Vietnamese boat people were received in the context of the
cold war. In both these situations, the political motives seemed fairly clear. However,
in the case of Iraqis, the political motivation to resettle this population may not have
been as clear-cut. However, if the public did show alarming concern regarding an
issue, politicians were found more likely to act in this direction.245

In addition, when stories or issues hit the media, and were thus repeatedly brought to
the attention of political actors, politicians are again forced to react.246 However, very
few Iraqi stories were seen in the Canadian media at the time in 2007. One of the few
examples of the broadcasted stories was one of an Iraqi woman who was resettled
from Syria, after a Canadian journalist had done a piece on her story while she was
still in hiding in Damascus. It felt that the story had particular impact partly due to the
fact that the woman was fluent in English, and was thus able to clearly describe her
situation and string of severe misfortunes. Her ability to communicate in English may
have thus enabled Canadians to relate to her in a more significant and direct manner
244
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than if this story had been recounted through the voice of an interpreter. After hearing
the broadcast, a group of Canadian women who had never been involved in refugee
sponsorship or advocacy sponsored this woman and her two children to Canada. This
story was aired sometime in 2007, at the height of public pressures on the government
to increase its efforts to alleviate the Iraqi crisis, and was believed to have had an
effect on the public’s level of interest in the Iraqi refugee issue.247

Lobbying in favor of Iraqi resettlement to Canada
In 2008, specific groups within the Iraqi community started lobbying at the Canadian
ministerial level. The more vocal groups were the Asyrian community, the Chaldean
community, but also other members of the general public. According to CIC, public
opinion must be taken into consideration by the Minister, and social action and grass
roots movements are some of the most effective strategies to exercise influence on the
policy-making process. For example, if a politician is repeatedly approached by his or
her constituents or congregation, he or she would inevitably develop a sense of
obligation to actively listen, and act. Thus, for individuals to call or write to their
Members of Parliament does have an influence on the policies they are registering
their input on.248

However, while the voices of many regular citizens would be considered to have a
considerable amount of weight in the eyes of politicians, some organizations who are
often heard by the government are considered to be at times not as effective. A lobby
group may thus be considered to only represent this group’s view and interest, rather
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than those of the public.249 Although CCR felt it was unfortunate that government
held this opinion, they maintained that an organization such as CCR represented the
best negotiating tool for individual members, and for small member organizations,
most often taken up by their own refugee-aiding and other professional activities.
Still, however, although CIC’s position with regards to interest groups was
understood, it was felt that CCR’s call to action relating to the Iraqi refugee crisis did
make a difference, especially in the context of the Iraqi refugee crisis, which was not
tackled heavily by the media, but rather, by individuals working directly with Iraqi
refugees on the ground.250
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS
At the outset of this research, the aim was to identify the different types of influences
that shaped the policy-making process relating to the resettlement of Iraqis refugees to
Canada. Through desk research and interviews with different actors in the field, the
author set out to better understand this process, and to fill in the gaps of knowledge on
the subject which had not until now been evident in the literature.

The aim of this thesis was to clarify the purpose of the Canadian government in
implementing its resettlement program, which initially appeared to be highly costly,
but yet also seemed to allow only for a minimal proportion of the world’s refugee
population to be resettled. The author questioned as well whether Canada managed to
resettle only the most vulnerable refugees, which was understood to be one of
Canada’s resettlement program’s original primary goals, and one of UNHCR’s
primary goals in implementing resettlement as a durable solution to refugee crises.
The reason for the particular timing and breadth of the resettlement of Iraqis to
Canada from 2003 to the present was an object of specific interest.

METHOLDOLOGY
Choice of expert interviewees
The sample of interviewees used in the context of this research allowed for an
exploration of some of the factors shaping the Canadian refugee resettlement program.
More varied data and perspective would need to be collected in order to arrive at
farther-reaching and more conclusive findings. The potential missing elements to this
research could have been the uncensored perspectives, information, and data from the
Minister and the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, from the Members of
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Parliament, and from the government budget – all elements that were not available to
the author in the course of this research. Although the information and perspectives
collected by the author were all valid in and of themselves, they remained for the most
part the personal or institutional opinions in the case of all interviewees except in that
of Ms. Pressé and Mr. Casasola. While Pressé and Casasola only offered the facts that
she was at liberty to share considering their positions within the governmental system
or UNHCR, the others’ perspectives were based on some facts, as well as on
insinuations of the government’s true intentions and priorities with regards to refugee
resettlement, and on the interviewees’ personal vision of what the principal aims of
the resettlement program should be.

Interview structure
As the author initially aimed to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of Canada’s
resettlement program, some of the questions that remained in the interview guides
resulted in the collection of much data that did not relate to the influences on the
refugee resettlement program. The most fruitful questions, however, were those that
related directly to the topic, including the facts or personal perspectives on how the
resettlement policy-making process takes place, as well as the main elements of
consideration for the decision makers of the resettlement program.

The author had also originally suspected that the influences could be separated in
three categories: economic influences, legal and humanitarian influences, and
political influences. It was found that although some of the influences could be
categorized as such, most were more complex, and were closely related to other
elements of the larger picture. For example, this was the case for the economic
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influence. As explained by CIC, although the Resettlement Division will aim to
invest the limited budget in a manner that will optimize the leverage of resettlement
activities, this budget is highly influenced by political actors, who are in turn
influenced by the Minister’s stated priorities, and where both the later and the former
are notably influenced by voters’ opinions, among other numerous factors.

RESEARCH FINDINGS
A synthesis of the main factors and individuals influencing the policy-making process
relating to the resettlement of Iraqis, and to the Canadian refugee resettlement system
as a whole is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Thesis Findings in a Glimpse
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CANADA’S HUMANITARIAN TRADITION VERSUS COST-SAVING PRIORITIES
While Beiser had argued that the Canadian government’s wish to uphold its
humanitarian reputation was one of the main reasons implementing its resettlement
program, particularly its small scale, Neuwirth had referred to this approach as
calculated kindness.251, 252 Basok, on the other hand, highlighted that Canada simply
did not consider refugees as potentially positive contributors to the Canadian
economy. She argued that due to the fact that refugees could no longer be used as
effective political leverage against states of opposing ideologies, refugees came to be
seen as mere burdens to the receiving state. Basok even felt that Canadian
government greatly influenced the idea now rooted in the public arena that refugees
are in fact disguised economic migrants whose possible intention is to take advantage
of the Canadian welfare system.253 Casasola had added that the application of the
‘ability to successfully establish criterion was a manner in which to reduce the weight
of this burden, by attempting to resettle individuals who had the ability to rapidly
integrate with limited assistance from the state.254

Similarly, CCR and AIC felt that Canada was often accomplishing just enough to
appear it was maintaining its humanitarian tradition, although not far beyond. This
was considered to be the case with the minimal support provided by Canada to high
needs cases, who were at times brought to Canada expediently, but without adequate
support and services made available to them upon their arrival to Canada.255,256
UNHCR and ICC also considered that one of the main factors driving Canada to
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resettle refugees was its humanitarian tradition.257,258 In fact, one of CIC’s officially
stated aims is to maintain Canada’s humanitarian tradition, notably through the
protection of refugees and others in refugee-like situation.259 However, it seemed
evident when looking at CIC’s perspective that the main priority of Canada’s refugee
resettlement programs was for the initiatives to remain effective.260 This aim could be
interpreted as an indication of actual intentions, aiming primarily to maintain
Canada’s humanitarian tradition and reputation, all by remaining cost-effective, rather
than simply aiming to protect refugees and others in need due to national moral
obligations.

Stein had noticed a problematic conceptualization in the major resettlement programs,
in their aims to become controlled and regularized, while refugee flows are neither
ever controlled, nor regularized.261 Such a conceptualization demonstrated even more
that the principal aim of a resettlement program, like that implemented by the
government of Canada, is not to resolve refugee crises, nor to attempt to find the best
manner to maximize the alleviation of refugee situations. Rather, as highlighted by
AIC and Williams, the aim would seem to lean more towards resettling some
refugees, although not necessarily the most vulnerable, but only a sufficient number to
appear to be resettling an appropriate volume that would indicate that Canada would
be resettling selecting its fair portion of the world’s refugee population. It also
indicated the government’s priority to have a structure that would be easily
manageable from a bureaucratic point of view, rather to construct a system that could
first and foremost address the refugee crises effectively.
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When also observing a decrease in the level of commitment of the major resettlement
countries of the time to resettle large numbers of refugees, Stein notably attributed this
to the increased unemployment rates in the main countries of resettlement. Although
the recent world economic crisis only took place in 2009, the resettlement budget had
not seen an increase in over a decade. It was made clear by CIC in the context of this
research that the ceiling of approximately 10,000 to 12,000 of refugees resettled to
Canada yearly was only due to the limited budget. CIC also explained that decisions
to resettle refugees from one location or another were also mainly based on costs;
Pressé described the factors involved in a possible refugee selection mission in a
remote refugee camp in Africa. She admitted that a group of refugees that would be
closer to a CIC mission abroad would of course reduce the cost of processing, and
thus allow for a greater number of refugees to be resettled sooner with the given
budgetary allowance. This was not to say that the refugees in remote locations would
never be reached by CIC, but rather, that there would be a necessity to wait until the
number of refugees was large enough to make a selection mission in this location
cost-effective.

In addition, CIC indicated that another major factor that guided Canada’s decisions in
terms of resettlement targets was UNHCR’s existing capacity in the potential source
country or country of asylum. UNHCR’s capacity in a given country is directly
related to its donors’ investments in a particular country office, or in a particular
funding campaign. In the case of a refugee movement in a country where none would
have occurred before, or where UNHCR would not have had major activities in the
past, Canada and other resettlement states would have to greatly invest in building the
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capacity of UNHCR in the region, rather than being able to capitalize on existing
infrastructure and human labor already on location. Given the limited budget
allocated by the Canadian Parliament to the resettlement program, CIC’s Resettlement
Division also considered it necessary to try to capitalize, when possible, on previous
investments that would have been done to increase UNHCR’s capacity. It thus
seemed more cost-effective, then, to initiate Canadian resettlement operations where
UNHCR would either already have the capacity to provide a sufficient number of
resettlement referrals, or for Canada to decide to embark on such an initiative with
other states willing to collectively invest in building the capacity of the Agency in a
given location, such as was the case for the resettlement of the Iraqis, the Bhutanese,
and other refugee populations resettled in large numbers in the past.

Saving costs in the context of the resettlement of Iraqis
It is arguable whether the Minister’s decision to increase GAR numbers for Iraqis ever
so slightly, while significantly increasing PSRs, was truly serving to meet the most
pressing needs of the Iraqi refugee population, or whether it was only allowing for a
group of a lucky few, rather than a group of particularly vulnerable individuals, to
benefit from resettlement to a safe third country. The resettlement of PSRs costs the
government a fraction of the resettlement of GARs, due to the fact that private
sponsors will cover what is generally covered by RAP – RAP representing the largest
cost in the entire process of resettlement. It thus seemed to be an obvious choice for a
government seeking to meet its most basic obligations at lower costs to favor the
allocation of spaces for PSRs, rather than for GARs.

National security, at all costs
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Although, of course, public programs must be liable to the individuals funding them,
i.e. the Canadian taxpayers, and that taking this under consideration, the government
must ensure to make its humanitarian programs efficient and effective, it was argued
by Williams that these cost-saving principals are not applied consistently with regards
to matters of immigration in particular. Here, she referred to the seemingly cap-less
budget dedicated to keeping individuals outside of Canada. Williams brought to light
the practices of interdiction implemented by the Migration Integrity Officers posted in
strategic locations around the globe, who have as a purpose to notably stop potential
asylum seekers abroad before they are able to make it to Canada to register an asylum
claim. Although she acknowledged that Canada must protect its borders and ensure
the security of its citizens, she considered as unbalanced the amount of resources that
were allegedly spent on interdiction activities around the world, and the fact that no
significant efforts seemed to be invested in making these activities cost-effective. It
seemed, rather, that the protection of national security was seen as having no limited
price. Alternatively, the protection of refugees was considered to be an endeavor that
could represent a risk to national security: the protection from potentially fraudulent
and ill-intended asylum seekers rather than the protection of asylum seekers truly in
need was thus considered an activity worthy of a limitless budget.

It should be highlighted, however, that no examples of costs related to the practices of
interdiction were known by the interviewee, nor was the author able to locate details
on the budget allocated to Canada’s MIO program. Nevertheless, one could still argue
that certain political motives and priorities may at times trump the aim to retain low
costs in program implementation, and that fears that refugees would represent a threat
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to Canada’s national security could also be used to justify over-riding the obligation to
protect these individuals under the 2002 IRPA.

IF YOU CAN’T RESETTLE EVERYONE, WHOM WILL YOU CHOOSE?
Despite the fact that the original aim of resettlement, according to UNHCR, was to
resettle the most vulnerable members of refugee populations, Stein had observed that
faced with an overwhelming number of individuals potentially in need of resettlement,
and the integration challenges faced by the resettled populations and their host
communities, resettlement communities started questioning who was truly deserving
of resettlement. It was notably reported that the fact that Iraqis were not vulnerable in
the same manner as Canadian SPOs had been used to receiving in the recent past, such
as the Karen, the Rohingyas, the Hmong, and others, may have worked against the
Iraqi group, and quickly created a reputation for the Iraqis as being demanding, and
perhaps ‘not sufficiently’ vulnerable. This did raise the question of whether refugees
like the Iraqis, having for the most part a formal educated and originating mainly from
urban contexts, were truly in need, or even deserving of resettlement. On the other
hand, it could also be argued that considering their urban and educational background,
Iraqis may not require such a high investment in the services available once in the
country of resettlement, which would thus free up resources, and allow for a greater
number of individuals to be resettled for the same cost.

Alternatively, one of Lanphier’s models of resettlement indicated that when the need
for cultural adaptation was too high, there would be a tendency to reduce the volume
of resettled individuals.262 AIC and Williams had highlighted, however, that a true
willingness to resettle all those in need of resettlement should logically be followed by
262
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a financial commitment to allow for ensuing initiatives to become effective remedies
to the issue at hand. The resettlement of vulnerable populations would thus imply the
need for humanitarian assistance for some time after resettlement has taken place. If
the will to support the resettled populations after their arrival in the country of asylum
is not present, there is a high risk, as it was reported by Pressé and Williams, for these
populations to remain in a liminal state for a number of years following their
resettlement. This risk was expressed by CIC, when speaking to the subject of the
immigrant loan program, and of the reports from different actors on the highly
detrimental effect the travel loans signed by refugees prior to their arrival to Canada
were having on these families.

Despite all these considerations, however, CIC admitted that in situations where the
Resettlement Division is not given sufficient funds to resettle all those deemed
vulnerable and in need of resettlement according to UNHCR’s assessment, CIC would
rather use resettlement strategically, in order to attempt to alleviate the ill
consequences of mass refugee flows in the regions of asylum for as many individuals
as possible. This strategic use of resettlement also pre-supposes that voluntary
repatriation and integration in the region or country of asylum are the two preferred
solutions to refugee crisis, while resettlement would only (and still) be used in cases
where individuals could not find peace and safety in their country of origin or of
asylum. In doing so, CIC thus seems to have resorted to making the optimal use of
the limited budget made available to them for the purposes of resettlement.

It is suggested, however, that the principles supporting the strategic use of
resettlement are not applied in the case of the PSR program. While it was considered
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that the PSR program allowed for Canada to resettle some of the vulnerable cases that
may have fallen through the cracks of the GAR program, IFR pointed to the fact that
the initial selection of PSRs was entirely up to the private sponsors, who would not
have an incentive to select the most vulnerable. Promoting the increase of PSRs
rather than GARs would thus also mean promoting the resettlement of less vulnerable
individuals over the most vulnerable members of a given refugee population.

Williams had also noted the absence of a system in Canada that would allow for the
resettlement of severe medical cases, which would generally be referred by UNHCR
to either the U.S. or other resettlement countries with referral systems that would
allow for the expedient movement of these cases. According to both CIC and
Williams, however, Canada is in the process of determining whether the creation of
such a referral mechanism for this specific population would be possible in the future,
especially due to the high number of highly vulnerable medical cases in need of
resettlement and of urgent medical care, and to UNHCR’s strong encouragement for
Canada and other resettlement countries to do so.

UNHCR AND CANADA’S RESETTLEMENT POLICY-MAKING PROCESS
Stein had identified another factor that could explain the decrease in resettlement
numbers worldwide at the time of his writing in 1983, which was UNHCR’s
prioritization of other durable solutions to refugee situations, where resettlement
would only be applied when other solutions would not be possible to implement.
Indeed, according to the findings of this research, second to economic factors,
UNCHR’s positions and calls for action seem to be the most influential on the
decision-making process relating to Canada’s refugee resettlement programs.
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In fact, when speaking of the Iraqi refugee resettlement context, CIC’s actions were
always preceded by the actions of UNHCR. The reason for this seems more evident
when speaking of the GAR program, which consists of the resettlement of individuals
who are referred by UNHCR. In the case of the Iraqi refugee crisis, Canada did not
seem to take the lead to call for UNHCR to begin resettlement operations in the
Middle East region for this group, but rather simply followed suit after the United
States’ request for UNHCR to begin resettlement operations for the Iraqi population.

Influence of UNHCR’s directives on Canada’s adjudication of PSRs
Canada only began resettling Iraqis in large numbers – through its GAR and PSR
programs – after resettlement operations were initiated by the United States and
UNHCR. As pointed out by Williams, and also confirmed during the author’s
interview with CIC, UNHCR involvement is actually not required at any level for the
Canadian PSR program to be implemented. Considering this, one fact that is difficult
to explain is why a number of Iraqi PSR cases submitted to CIC before 2007 were
denied resettlement, only to be accepted after the beginning of large-scale resettlement
operations for Iraqis. Prior to 2007, UNHCR was encouraging countries of
resettlement to follow a policy of containment for Iraqis, i.e. keeping Iraqis in the
Middle East region in the hopes that the situation in Iraq would improve and thus
allow for the population to gradually return. The other aim of UNHCR in
encouraging countries to adopt a containment policy prior to 2007 was due to the
Agency’s prognosis that the initiation of resettlement activities would result in an
increased pull factor to the countries where resettlement operations would be taking
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place. UNHCR feared that this would in turn further strain the already over-burdened
economies and infrastructures of the asylum states.

As suspected by Williams, it is perhaps in this light that Canada made the decision not
to approve any PSR cases prior to 2007, considering that another possible durable
solution could possibly be in sight for these cases. Upon considering the factors
brought forward by UNHCR and CIC, it seemed that their decision was more based
on the prevention of aggravating factors, rather than the lack of political will to assist
Iraqis.

UNHCR’s dependence on sovereign states’ contributions
It should be noted that UNHCR cannot initiate any resettlement operations without a)
the commitments of resettlement states to offer a certain number of resettlement
space, and b) the financial commitments of various contributors. Below is a table
outlining various countries’ contributions to UNHCR per capita.
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Table 4: Country contributions to UNHCR per capita, 2009
Population*
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Netherlands
USA
Australia
Canada
Spain
Japan
United Kingdom
Germany
European Commission

4,660,539
9,059,651
5,500,510
16,715,999
307,212,123
21,262,641
33,487,208
40,525,002
127,078,679
61,113,205
82,329,758
499,723,520***

Contribution to
UNHCR**
60,642,612
107,885,397
52,132,909
80,617,231
640,726,528
32,873,505
45,561,841
39,539,195
110,553,715
41,997,362
54,529,973
126,947,661

Contribution per
capita (USD)
13.01
11.90
9.48
4.82
2.09
1.55
1.36
0.98
0.87
0.69
0.66
0.25

*With the exception of European Commission data, figures obtained from Central Intelligence Agency.
(2010). CIA – The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
**UNHCR. (2009e). UNHCR – 2009 Contributions to UNHCR Programmes, as of 31 December 2009
(table), http://www.unhcr.org/45f025a92.html
***Eurostat. (2010). Eurostat – Tables, Graphs and Maps Interface (TGM) table,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelectio
n=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1

As can be noted above, Canada only contributed USD 1.36 per capita to UNHCR in
2009, far behind Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and 45% less than the U.S. In net
numbers, Canada was the ninth largest contributor to UNHCR in 2009. However, this
data should also be put in contrast to the fact that Canada is the second largest
resettlement country after the Unites States. Thus, although Canada does not seem to
be one of the top donors to UNHCR, it does seem to contribute to the refugee aiding
efforts in various forms. In fact, UNHCR insisted that CIC was considered to be a
key partner to UNHCR and leader in the resettlement community in the context of the
strategic implementation of resettlement. UNHCR commended Canada’s significant
participation in the resettlement of the Bhutanese from Nepal and Iraqis from different
parts of the Middle East.
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Resettlement is still considered to be a privilege for those resettled, and a voluntary
activity for potential resettlement countries to implement, rather than an obligation
based one of Canada’s signed agreements. The principle of responsibility sharing
simply implies that the country contributes in some way to attempt to alleviate refugee
crises, and assist of those in a state of asylum. According to the principle of state
sovereignty, it is entirely up to the state to decide to what extent their contributions to
alleviate a given refugee crisis will reach. In such an equation, however, states are left
with the upper hand, while UNHCR and other refugee-aiding organizations must
attempt to find the best solutions for all those affected, given the limited resources
made available to them, and the fact that some levels of the Canadian government will
only accept to commit a certain level of budget that would serve to accomplish just
enough to uphold Canada’s humanitarian image. However, at the level of the
Resettlement Division of CIC, it was found that Canadian civil servants will generally
follow UNHCR’s footsteps, respond to UNHCR’s calls for action, and do its best to
make the most effective use of a constrained budget.

UNHCR-CIC relationship at play in the context of the resettlement of Iraqis
It was clear from the author’s reading of the meeting minutes of the Standing
Committee for Citizenship and Immigration where UNHCR spoke before the
Committee, and from the author’s interview with UNHCR, that UNHCR was hoping
for Canada to increase the budget allocation to its refugee program for Iraqis in order
to be able to refer a larger number of Iraqis for resettlement to Canada, and to further
finance the activities of UNHCR in the Middle East region, including the assistance
and support for those still in a state of asylum. It was understood that UNHCR was in
a delicate position, where it had to both repeatedly express gratitude to all donors for
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all their contributions on one end, but yet also continue to appeal to these same donors
for more funding on the other.

CANADA’S RESETTLEMENT MODEL AND POLICIES
Low volume of resettlement focusing on economic integration
With his resettlement models, Lamphier’s categorized Canada’s resettlement program
as a low-volume model focused on economic integration, while the Province of
Quebec’s model was also low-volume, but was said to focus more on cultural
integration. However, the ‘ability to establish’ criterion included in the Canada
chapter of UNHCR resettlement handbook would indicate otherwise; that Canada
would indeed focus on a low-volume model, but that it would aim for both economic
and cultural integration, such as highlighted by Basok and Casasola.263 In fact, CIC’s
Minister currently wishes to increase newcomers’ knowledge of their civic rights and
responsibilities, and increase the eligibility criteria for Canadian citizenship.264 He
also wishes to increase language requirements for both individuals wishing to apply
for immigration, and eventually for Canadian citizenship.265 This is expected to
translate into a focus on selecting migrants who are more likely to integrate quickly
and easily, and on an informal level, reduce the tendency to select individuals (i.e.
refugees) who would not have such characteristics, and would require more public
efforts to facilitate their economic integration and cultural adaptation to Canada.

Policy pilars and consultations with stakeholders

263

Casasola, M. (2001). Ibid.
JasonKenney.ca. (2009). Launch of Discover Canada: The rights and responsibilities of citizenship,
http://www.jasonkenney.com/EN/4961/101167
265
CIC. (2009g). Speech – Minister Jason Kenney, March 20, 2009,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/speeches/2009/2009-03-20.asp
264
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Canada and the rest of the resettlement community agreed on implementing
resettlement as a tool for individual protection, as a strategy, as an avenue to share
global responsibilities, and as a possible durable solution. Using this framework as a
starting point, CIC embarks on domestic and international consultations to determine
which groups should be prioritized by Canada for resettlement. These consultants
include various domestic stakeholders, and refugee sponsors for the first time in 2009,
as well as UNHCR, other resettlement countries, CIC missions abroad, among others.
However, Basok did highlight that such consultation processes, as well as the
appearance that PSRs and SPOs had some influence on the direction of Canada’s
resettlement program, was just that – merely an appearance. She argued that the
Canadian government had in fact complete control over all aspects of the program,
and all decisions regarding who would be resettled to Canada.

Principle of responsibility sharing favoring some over others
CIC highlighted that an inevitable consideration is the existence of previous multiyear resettlement commitments, and Canada’s commitment to assisting its nearest
refugee population in need, i.e. the Colombians. CIC explained that Colombians
constituted one of the top source countries for refugees for the last two decades,
because of the simple fact that they represented the largest refugee population in need
of settlement in the Western hemisphere. Canadians may have also felt less
concerned by the plight of Iraqis, compared to that of these Colombians, or Afghans,
or other groups, due to their voluntary lack of involvement in the 2003 U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq. Thus, from a socio-psychological point of view, it would seem
comprehensible, as also argued by the IFR and the ICC, that Canadians would feel
less compelled or obligated to assist the Iraqi refugee population, if given the
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obligation to choose between many groups in need of a durable solution to their state
of asylum.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS LEADING TO DELAYS
As mentioned above, the cost-effectiveness of resettlement operations is an important
consideration in the policy-making process relating to resettlement. In addition,
following the period of time necessary to determine whether resettlement will be the
appropriate durable solution for a given group at a given time, resettlement operations
will take considerable time to get underway, especially if sufficiently substantial
UNHCR infrastructure does not exist in the affected region. One aspect that is
particularly labor-intensive for UNHCR is the range of referral and procedural
requirements asked of UNHCR from all resettlement countries, such as the different
formats and types of referral forms, different medical examination procedures,
exclusions, security check procedures, etc. Other operational considerations include
the start up time for the CIC offices in Canada processing PSR files before they are
sent abroad, as well as the difficulty, or near impossibility, due to the numerous
factors involved, of predicting when medical examinations, security checks, and other
formalities will be completed in order for the refugees to start departing from their
country of asylum to the country of resettlement.

IRAQI CHRISTIANS RESETTLED IN HIGHER PROPORTIONS
In the case of Iraqis, it was suspected at the beginning of this research that Canada’s
resettlement of Iraqis was largely a Christian movement. It was also the observation of
the CIC officers on the ground that a higher proportion of Christians were being
interviewed for resettlement. CIC also admitted that the Iraqis sponsoring individuals
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from Canada were for the most part Christian, and thus also tended to sponsor either
Christian relatives or members of their former communities in Iraq. Explanations
regarding this observation varied: first, UNHCR admitted that the proportion of
Christian registrations in the UNCHR office in the regions (14%) was higher than the
proportion of Iraqi Christians in Iraq (3%) and that Iraqi Christians constituted a large
portion of those referred for resettlement. These proportions could indicate that the
Iraqi Christians had stronger cases for resettlement, in that they were less likely than
others to find a durable solution in their country of asylum or Iraq. Alternatively, this
could also indicate that the Iraqi Christians were unjustly favored over others to be
considered for resettlement. However, Williams, who witnessed the resettlement
operations in Damascus, claimed that UNHCR’s process seemed balanced and nondiscriminatory, while others were of the opinion that the CIC Minister gave
preferential treatment to Christian refugee groups, rather than Muslims. However, no
evidence of such bias on the part of the Minister was collected in the context of this
research.

POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF DIVERGING OPINIONS WITHIN THE IRAQI COMMUNITY
The diversity of the perspectives expressed by the Iraqis interviewed for this research
project was also particularly interesting. It was expected that all Iraqi individuals in
Canada would be hoping and lobbying for the government to increase Iraqi
resettlement numbers. However, this was not found to be consistently the case. ICC
and IFR’s Mr. Mashrook had similar perspectives in that they held a positive regard
for the Canadian government and its refugee resettlement program. They believed,
however, that as much as Canada and others could come together to resettle a large
number of Iraqis, this would not bring a resolution to the Iraqi crisis. Rather,
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resettlement could only serve as a solution for a handful of individuals, and a
temporary solution at best for all those who would remain in the countries of asylum
and who would thus have access to a greater proportion of the available support
services and financial assistance. They did also see, however, the potential advantage
of having the resettled individuals send remittances to the asylum population or to the
country of origin, to assist with post-conflict reconstruction.

Contrary to his IFR colleagues and to the ICC, the perspective of Mr. Saeed was that
Canada was not doing enough to assist the Iraqi population, more particularly in terms
of resettlement. He felt that Canada was not resettling a large enough number of
Iraqis, and that those it was resettling were not necessarily the most vulnerable. He
argued, notably, that by increasing the resettlement spaces allocated to the PSRs, the
government was allowing private sponsors to determine who would be prioritized.
Saeed warned that these would not necessarily be the most vulnerable, but rather,
simply those who had the chance of having pre-existing ties with Iraqis in Canada, or
those who had the chance of being selected by sponsorship groups who would have
had their case brought to their attention through a diversity of possibility of channels.
Saeed thus felt that Canada should instead increase the number of GARs, in order to
assist those most in need, and therefore also free up the likely higher proportion of
services and financial assistance these more vulnerable individuals would be utilizing
in the communities of asylum surrounding Iraq.

The ICC representative, on the other hand, was of the opinion that Canada was
meeting its obligations in terms of resettlement, although he felt that those who were
resettled were not receiving enough assistance upon arrival. He mainly hoped that the
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government would recognize the work that ICC done voluntarily to assist newly
arrived Iraqi refugees, and that with this recognition they could be financially
supported by the government to continue this work for Iraqis and also others in need
upon arrival.

Based on Pressé’s shared perspective, it could be argued that the inconsistency in the
message coming from the Iraqi community in Canada may have made their lobbying
less strong in the eyes of the government, and therefore less worthy of attention. As
was found in this research, other than the lobbying done by Iraqi Christian groups, and
the IFR’s and ICC’s participation in CCR’s call for action, neither the Canadian
public nor a considerable number of Iraqis in Canada were found to have made public
requests for the government to increase its resettlement numbers, or its assistance to
Iraq and its people. It can be argued that perhaps one strong and unified voice coming
from the Iraqi communities in Canada would have given the Canadian government
more incentive to act sooner and in a more significant manner to assist Iraqi refugees.

VARYING VISIONS OF THE CANADIAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS’ CORE AIMS
Those interviewed in the context of this study each held a unique vision of what the
Canadian refugee resettlement program should aim to accomplish. This vision
inevitably colored the nature of their advocacy, as well as the influence of this
advocacy on the policy-making process. ICC’s vision of the Canadian refugee
resettlement program, shared by IFR’s Mr. Mashrook, was that resettlement only
represented one of many options available to Iraqi refugees and potential immigrants,
that the program is and should remain fair and generous, and that, according to
Altalibi, Canada should continue to resettle Iraqis, in the realm of the government’s
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stated capacity to do so. IFR’s Mr. Saeed’s vision of the program was that it should
focus on the most vulnerable portion of the refugee population.

Alternatively, while the Canadian government’s principal aim in implementing its
resettlement program is to maintain its humanitarian tradition, the aim of Ms. Pressé is
for the resettlement program to be as effective as possible in relieving the risks
experienced by the refugees themselves, as well as relieving the pressures experienced
by asylum states, other resettlement countries, and UNHCR. Her intentions thus
seemed to be rooted in humanitarian goals, whilst being limited by the resources made
available to CIC’s Resettlement Division by elected officials. On the other hand,
UNHCR’s hope was for the Canadian government to allocate more funds to its
refugee-aiding programs, both abroad, through resettlement or assistance to those
living in countries of asylum, and in Canada, through its in-land asylum system.
UNHCR thus envisioned the refugee program being used as a tool for Canada to meet
its fair share of responsibility regarding the world’s refugee population, and that
together with the other members of the international community, it would help Canada
find durable solutions to these crises. UNHCR’s vision and advocacy thus seemed
highly effective and influential in this policy making process, seemingly due to the
fact that it was based on the principles enounced in the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol, as well as on the principle of responsibility sharing, which CIC explained
were essentially the basis of the Canadian refugee resettlement programs.

Lastly, the perspective of Williams and AIC was that Canada should be using its
resettlement program first and foremost to meet the human and moral obligations that
derive from the event of refugee situations. Williams and AIC consider that these
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human and moral obligations are inherently linked to international and domestic legal
obligations, which, they argue, are not being adequately considered by Canada on
several levels. Williams held that Canada will always seem like it is doing the right
thing, however, when having to choose between meeting its most basic obligations,
and acting on moral and humanitarian grounds that would go beyond these
obligations, Canada would seem to often choose to follow easier and most costeffective route.

The main issue with these visions, however, was the fact that they were based on
international principles that either Canada had not adhered to or ratified, or that
Canada’s positions on these international laws was unclear, and subject to
interpretation, most particularly with regards to statelessness. Thus, although AIC and
CCR would hope for CIC to consider its humanitarian and moral obligations and
resettle Iraqis as a result of it, numerous other factors are at play and considered by
CIC to be inevitable for them to consider. The perspective of CIC in comparison to
the perspective of AIC and CCR would therefore seem irreconcilable. The one
element that would seem to have a considerable influence on the government officials
deciding on the budget for resettlement program, however, would be the Canadian
voters. If AIC and CCR would target these and manage to convince voters that the
resettlement program deserves further funding, and that more Iraqis or others need to
be resettled, the politicians are likely to react favorably in order to secure their vote in
future elections.

In sum, in order for lobbying efforts relating to the protection of refugees and asylum
seekers to be effective and to have an influence on the policy-making process, it was
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found that these should specifically focus on the ratification of these international
instruments, or on Canada’s interest in making such legal commitments, rather than
lobby specifically on issues for which Canada has no legal obligation to act on. If
advocacy movement does not directly relate to the government’s core aims and
directives, these movements essentially lose their purpose. As confirmed by CIC, the
influence of these individuals and organizations on the policy making process will
strongly be linked to the way in which their input is delivered, and to the
government’s perceived relevance of their input.
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this research was to identify the various influences on the policy-making
process relating to the Canadian Refugee Resettlement Program, more specifically in
relation to the Iraqi refugee movement. The author explored pre-existing literature on
the topic, which had focused mainly on resettlement trends dating a few decades.
Resettlement had gone from being one of the main durable solutions implemented in
responses to the world’s refugee crises in the seventies and eighties, to being one of
the last options considered. However, resettlement is still part and parcel of Canada’s
humanitarian agenda, despite its high costs and limited breadth. Thus, considering in
particular the timing and the seemingly limited scope of the resettlement of Iraqis to
Canada, the author examined the rationale behind the continued use of this durable
solution to refugee crises.

By interviewing various actors in the field, including a Canadian government
representative, UNHCR, Amnesty International Canada, and others, the author found
that one of the main factors influencing the number of Iraqis who are resettled to
Canada is the limited budget allocated to the resettlement program, which is
determined by the Canadian Parliament, which is in turn mainly influenced by
Canadian voters, and the preservation of Canada’s humanitarian image. The other
main influencing body is UNHCR, which will assess a given refugee populations’
needs in terms of durable solutions, and bring resettlement countries such as Canada
to take one course of action or another to alleviate a given crisis. Another important
finding was related to the influence of public lobbying. Although the public and
lobby groups did not have as great an influence in Canada’s decision to increase the
resettlement targets for Iraqis as they had for other groups in the past, this research
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indicated that if and when masses of Canadian voters voice their concern on a
particular issue, at multiple levels, this will inevitably have some desired
repercussions on the government decision makers.

Although this research was exploratory and thus limited in scope, future research
projects on this topic should seek the perspectives of those determining programmatic
budgets within the government of Canada, such as Members of Parliament or their
staff. A larger sample of Iraqi Canadians could also be surveyed, considering the
differences in opinions observed in the small sample used in this research. Parallel
research projects on the Canadian refugee resettlement system could explore the
policy-making process relating to groups other than the Iraqis, such as the Bhutanese,
with considerably higher settlement needs, or the Darfuris, also with high needs, but
set in a far more challenging asylum environment.

Of particular interest would also be an exploration of the influences on the policymaking process of other countries’ resettlement programs, such as that of Australia,
whose program is of comparable breadth to the Canadian one. The American
program could also be analyzed, in order to compare the influences on a policymaking process in a comparable socio-cultural context, but within a different frame of
political, economic, and geographic factors.
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDES
1. INTERVIEW WITH MS. DEBRA PRESSÉ, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA
1. Could you describe the policy-making process involved in deciding
i) how many refugees (particularly Iraqis) will be resettled to Canada in a given
year, and;
ii) what other measures are taken by the Canadian government to alleviate the
current Iraqi crisis?
a. What are the step-by-step procedures, from the initiation of a policy to its
implementation?
b. What factors (economic, legal/humanitarian, and political), influence this
decision-making process?
2. Would it be possible to obtain CIC’s latest budget for every year since the 20032004 fiscal year?
a. If not detailed in the published budget, what is Canada’s total budget
dedicated to humanitarian programs?
i. What proportion of this budget is dedicated to Iraq (i.e. total aid
donated for reconstruction, assisting IDPs, assisting refugees in
main countries of asylum, etc.)?
ii. What proportion of this Iraq budget is dedicated to the resettlement
of Iraqis?
b. What is the yearly cost of Canada’s Refugee Resettlement program since
2003? What is the projected cost for this fiscal year 2009-2010?
c. What proportion of this cost has been dedicated to the resettlement of Iraqi
refugees? If possible, can we obtain a breakdown of these expenditures for
the Iraqi group, i.e. donations/expenditures to UNHCR, Canadian Embassy
processing, CIC processing costs, Matching Center, Movements costs
(IOM services including booking of flights, Canadian Orientation Abroad
program, etc.) medicals assessments & flights (Are these included in
budget? Or not included as these costs are charged to the applicants and
repaid through the Immigrant Loan Program?), Canadian Border Services
Agency processing incoming refugees at the airport, funds allocated to
NGOs receiving refugees at the airport like ‘IRIS’, also Reception Houses,
Service Providing Agencies, cost per applicant for the Interim Federal
Health program, financial assistance for refugees, and costs related to the
resettlement of Privately Sponsored Refugees? Also, are there any other
related costs?
3. How many Iraqis has Canada resettled since 2003 (or even since 1991, if data is
available) under the GAR program, the PSR program, or any other special
program (One-Year Program, Urgent Protection Program (UPP), or other – please
specify)?
4. According to the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, Canada Chapter, “applicants
must show potential to become self-sufficient and successfully establish in Canada
within a 3 to 5 year time frame […] [although] this criteria does not apply to
refugees determined by a visa officer who fall within the categories: ‘urgent need
of protection’ or ‘vulnerable’.
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a. In approximately what proportion of Iraqi refugee cases is the criteria of
“potential to become self-sufficient and to successfully establish in
Canada” applied?
b. Are other criteria used in the selection of Iraqis refugees?
5. Would it be possible to obtain a breakdown of the profile of the Iraqis resettled to
Canada since 2003?
 Separated by program (Government-Assisted, Privately Sponsored, or
others)
 According to religious group, ethnic background, male/females, family
size, age, and according to UNHCR refugee category (medical needs,
survivors of violence and torture, women at risk, etc.), etc.
2. INTERVIEW WITH MR. MICHAEL CASASOLA, UNHCR OTTAWA
1. What do you think influences Canada’s resettlement policies relating to Iraqis?
a. Legal/humanitarian influences:
b. Economic influences:
c. Political influences:
d. Other:
2. Has UNHCR appealed to Canada in particular to resettle (more) Iraqi refugees? If
so:
a. In what instances?
b. What were Canada’s reactions to these appeals, and the results of these
appeals?
3. Do you believe that UNHCR, or other local or international NGOs, the Iraqi
people living in Canada, or other citizens or residents, have any influence on
Canada’s policy-making process relating to the resettlement of Iraqis?
a. How so?
b. If yes, what is the weight of these influences, and how do they play
out?
4. According to UNHCR, is Canada upholding its international legal obligations in
relation to ratified, but not incorporated international laws relating to refugees?
5. Is Canada upholding its responsibilities and obligations as a proportional burdensharer with regards to world refugee issues, and most particularly, with regards to
the Iraqi crisis?
6. Has Canada upheld its commitment to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, most particularly in relation to the Iraqi refugee
crisis? How so?
7. Is Canada upholding its national legal obligations, commitments, and policies
related to refugees, more particularly Iraqis?
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8. Is Canada upholding its humanitarian and non-discriminatory principles in the
context of selecting refugees for resettlement? (by applying, for example, the
criteria of “potential to become self-sufficient and to successfully establish in
Canada”, or by not resettling particular medical cases?)
9. How many Iraqi refugee cases have been referred to Canada for resettlement since
2003 (yearly breakdown)?
10. How many have been accepted for resettlement to Canada since 2003 (yearly
breakdown)?
11. Out of all individuals/cases referred to Canada, are you able to provide us with the
proportion of individuals/cases referred under each UNHCR refugee category
(medical needs, survivors of violence and torture, women at risk, etc.) to Canada?
12. If so, are you also able to provide us with the proportion of individuals under each
UNHCR referral category that are approved for resettlement to Canada?
13. According to UNHCR, is Canada resettling the most vulnerable refugees, the most
likely to successfully establish, or both,
a. Amongst the world refugee population?
b. Amongst the Iraqi refugee population?
3. INTERVIEW WITH MS. GRACE WU, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CANADA
1. What do you think influences Canada’s resettlement policies relating to Iraqis?
a. Legal/humanitarian influences:
b. Economic influences:
c. Political influences:
d. Other:
2. In December 2007, Amnesty International Canada’s secretary General, Mr. Alex
Neve, stood before the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration and
urged the Canadian government to development an action plan for Iraqi refugees,
that would ensure the following:
1) that multilateral and NGO efforts to provide assistance to Iraqi refugees
and internally displaced Iraqis receive adequate and sustained funding;
2) that front-line states, particularly Syria and Jordan, are provided with the
financial support needed to ensure they can provide the level of protection and
assistance required;
3) that more generous opportunities for resettlement become available so that
vulnerable Iraqis who are not safe or adequately protected in the region can
move to other countries; and
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4) that there is a common commitment from all countries in the region and
around the world to refrain from forced returns to Iraq.266
Does Amnesty International Canada feel that the Canadian Government has acted on
any of these appeals? If yes, how so?
3. Has Amnesty appealed to Canada in particular to alleviate the Iraqi refugee
situation in other instances? If so, what were Canada’s reactions to these appeals,
and the results of these appeals?
4. Do you believe that Amnesty, or other local or international NGOs, the Iraqi
people living in Canada, or other citizens or residents, have any influence on
Canada’s policy-making process relating to the resettlement of Iraqis?
a. How so?
b. If yes, what is the weight of these influences, and how do they play out?
5. According to Amnesty, is Canada upholding its international legal obligations
relating to refugees?
6. Is Canada upholding its responsibilities and obligations as a proportional burdensharer with regards to world refugee issues, and most particularly, with regards to
the Iraqi crisis?
7. Is Canada upholding its national legal obligations, commitments, and policies
related to refugees, more particularly Iraqis?
8. Is Canada upholding its humanitarian and non-discriminatory principles in the
context of selecting refugees for resettlement? (by applying, for example, the
criteria of “potential to become self-sufficient and to successfully establish in
Canada”, or by not resettling particular medical cases?)
4. INTERVIEW WITH THE IRAQI FEDERATION OF REFUGEES
1. What do you think influences Canada’s refugee resettlement policies relating to
Iraqis?
a. Legal/humanitarian influences
b. Economic influences
c. Political influences
d. Other?
2. Did your organization, or members of your organization, appeal to the Canadian
government to not get involved in the 2003 invasion of Iraq? If yes:
a. How so?
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b. According to you, what was the weight of your organization’s appeal in
Canada’s decision relating to not getting involved in the 2003 invasion of
Iraq?
3. Has your organization appealed to the Canadian government to get (further)
involved in alleviating the Iraqi refugee crisis? If yes:
a. How so?
b. According to you, what has been the weight of your organization’s appeals
on Canada’s policy-making process relating to the Iraqi refugee crisis?
4. Do you believe your organization, or other local or international NGOs, the Iraqi
people living in Canada, or other citizens or residents, have any influence on
Canada’s policy-making process relating to the resettlement of Iraqis?
a. How so?
b. If yes, what is the weight of this influence, and how do you think it plays
out?
5. According to you, is Canada upholding its international legal obligations in
relation to international laws relating to refugees?
6. Is Canada upholding its national legal obligations, commitments, and policies
related to refugees, more particularly Iraqis?
7. Is Canada upholding its responsibilities and obligations as a proportional burdensharer with regards to world refugee issues, and most particularly, with regards to
the Iraqi crisis?
8. According to you, among the world’s Iraqi refugee population, is Canada
resettling a) the most vulnerable refugees, b) those most likely to successfully
establish in Canada, or c) both?
5. INTERVIEW WITH MS. GLYNIS WILLIAMS, CCR, ACTION RÉFUGIÉS MONTREAL, AND
FORMER ICMC DEPLOYEE TO UNHCR SYRIA
1. What do you think influences Canada’s resettlement policies relating to Iraqis
a. Legal/humanitarian influences
b. Economic influences
c. Political influences
d. Other?
2. Did CCR appeal to the Canadian government to not get involved in the 2003
invasion of Iraq? If yes:
a. How so?
b. What was the weight of CCR’s appeal in Canada’s decision relating to not
getting involved in the 2003 invasion of Iraq?
3. Has CCR appealed to the Canadian government to get (further) involved in
alleviating the Iraqi refugee crisis? If yes:
a. How so?
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b. What has been the weight of CCR’s appeals Canada’s policy-mking
process relating to the Iraqi refugee crisis?
4. Do you believe the Canadian Council for Refugees, or other local or international
NGOs, the Iraqi people living in Canada, or other citizens or residents, have any
influence on Canada’s policy-making process relating to the resettlement of
Iraqis?
a. How so?
b. If yes, what is the weight of this influence, and how does it play out?
5. Is Canada upholding its international legal obligations in relation to ratified, but
not incorporated international laws relating to refugees?
6. Is Canada upholding its national legal obligations, commitments, and policies
related to refugees, more particularly Iraqis?
7. Is Canada upholding its responsibilities and obligations as a proportional burdensharer with regards to world refugee issues, and most particularly, with regards to
the Iraqi crisis?
8. Is Canada upholding its humanitarian and non-discriminatory principles in the
context of selecting refugees for resettlement? (by applying, for example, the
criteria of “potential to become self-sufficient and to successfully establish in
Canada”, or by not resettling particular medical cases?)
9. Is Canada resettling the most vulnerable refugees, the most likely to successfully
establish, or both,
a. Amongst the world refugee population?
b. Amongst the Iraqi refugee population?
6. INTERVIEW WITH MR. MOAYED ALTALIBI, IRAQI COMMUNITY CENTER OF
MONTREAL
1. What do you think influences Canada’s refugee resettlement policies relating to
Iraqis
a. Legal/humanitarian influences
b. Economic influences
c. Political influences
d. Other?
2. Did your organization, or members of your organization, appeal to the Canadian
government to not get involved in the 2003 invasion of Iraq? If yes:
a. How so?
b. According to you, what was the weight of your organization’s appeal in
Canada’s decision relating to not getting involved in the 2003 invasion of
Iraq?
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3. Has your organization appealed to the Canadian government to get (further)
involved in alleviating the Iraqi refugee crisis? If yes:
a. How so?
b. According to you, what has been the weight of your organization’s appeals
on Canada’s policy-making process relating to the Iraqi refugee crisis?
4. Do you believe your organization, or other local or international NGOs, the Iraqi
people living in Canada, or other citizens or residents, have any influence on
Canada’s policy-making process relating to the resettlement of Iraqis?
a. How so?
b. If yes, what is the weight of this influence, and how do you think it plays
out?
5. According to you, is Canada upholding its international legal obligations in
relation to international laws relating to refugees?
6. Is Canada upholding its national legal obligations, commitments, and policies
related to refugees, more particularly Iraqis?
7. Is Canada upholding its responsibilities and obligations as a proportional burdensharer with regards to world refugee issues, and most particularly, with regards to
the Iraqi crisis?
8. According to you, among the world’s Iraqi refugee population, is Canada
resettling a) the most vulnerable refugees, b) those most likely to successfully
establish in Canada, or c) both?

132

